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Thesis title: Short-term stock returns following rating agencies announcements in large 
European firms. 
Author: Jerson Li Lin 
Using Moody’s and S&P’s bond and credit watch announcements between 2007 and 2016, I 
have found inconsistent results comparing to prior literatures. Conducting an event study to 
analyse the stock market, no reliable abnormal returns following downgrades were found 
while significant returns were observed following upgrades. Nevertheless, for changes within 
speculative grade both downgrades and upgrades had reliable abnormal returns. An analysis 
over the global financial crisis shows that the market can anticipate the rating changes and 
further reacts after downgrade announcements. After the crisis period very significant 
abnormal returns are observed only for upgrade announcements. For changes in Outlook, the 
market also seems have had anticipated, but after positive announcements the market reacts 
in the opposite expected direction. The same occurs for negative outlook announcements 
after the crisis period.  
The main explanation for my results being inconsistent with prior studies relies on the global 
financial crisis started in 2007 when markets went down drastically. During the recovery from 
the global financial crisis, many stocks were underpriced making rating downgrades ineffective 






Título da tese: Short-term stock returns following rating agencies announcements in European 
large firms. 
Autor: Jerson Li Lin 
Usando publicações de rating de crédito e revisão de crédito das principais agências de rating 
Moody’s e S&P, foram encontrados algumas inconsistências nos resultados em relação à 
literatura existente. Levando a cabo um estudo de evento para analisar o mercado de acções, 
não foram encontrados retornos anormais significativos após reduções de ratings enquanto 
que após melhoria de ratings apresentam resultados anormais significativos. Contudo, numa 
análise somente com ratings especulativos, existem resultados anormais significativos tanto 
para reduções como para melhorias de rating. Durante a crise financeira global, os resultados 
mostram que os mercados antecipam as mudanças de rating e no caso das reduções, o 
mercado reage negativamente com resultados significativos. Após o período de crise, 
resultados significativos só são observados em melhorias de rating. Para mudanças de revisão 
de crédito, o mercado também mostrou antecipar-se às publicações, sendo que 
posteriormente às revisões positivas, o mercado reage de forma oposta às expectativas. O 
mesmo acontece para revisões negativas após o período de crise.  
A principal explicação para os meus resultados serem inconsistentes com estudos anteriores 
reside na crise financeira global onde os mercados caíram de forma drástica. Durante o 
período de recuperação, muitos mercados de acções encontravam-se subvalorizados tornando 
as publicações de redução de rating inefectivas aos preços das acções e as publicações de 
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Almost every investor or financial institution relies on Moody’s and S&P’s credit ratings 
whenever these two main rating agencies provide ratings. These agencies provide information 
about the creditworthiness of an issuer or issue within a grade scale. They might provide 
different ratings for the same issue or issuer, as the models and tools  used to determine the 
grades are different. Investors and financial institutions can have access to the information 
explaining the reasoning behind the rating attribution. 
Rating agencies regularly revise the ratings of issues and issuers. They change the rating 
whenever they find there is a change in the creditworthiness of an issuer or issue which they 
are following. They also announce a Credit Watch when a rating is under review and until 
further news are obtained by the rating agencies to determine the measures that should be 
applied for the issuer or issue. According to S&P and Moody’s, credit watch is applied when 
they believe that an opinion will likely be released within 90 days.  
Some investors believe that rating agencies bring new information while others do not. On one 
hand, Moody’s and S&P have private meetings with the management team to have a deeper 
understanding over the company’s financial situation and make projections for the future 
performance. On the other hand, rating changes are not attributed immediately after the 
considered key factors reach a different rating. There is usually a lag between the moment that 
financial ratios and qualitative factors score a different rating and the moment the rating 
change is announced. According to Altman and Rijken (2006), rating agencies are many times 
criticized for delaying downgrades or upgrades in relation to financial markets. Investors do 
not like big volatility or ratings reflecting small changes on financial ratios.  Therefore, rating 
agencies focus more on long term factors avoiding excessive reversals of rating changes.  
In the middle of 2007, the global financial crisis started to show its effects. Stock markets have 
fallen and large institutions all around the world considered to be financially stable have 
collapsed or have been bought by other institutions, and even wealthiest countries have had 
to find rescue solutions to protect their financial system. According to Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection act, rating agencies were one of the triggers of the crisis as 
they did not do a good job in evaluating bonds and instead, their poor performance led 
investors misunderstand the real financial structure and creditworthiness of the various debt 
instruments. The Council on Foreign Relations stated that the “Big Three” rating agencies faced 
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some intense legal scrutiny over their business practices, where they issued overly favourable 
ratings to increase the demand of its services and not losing it to its competitors (in that time 
the competition was mainly between Moody’s, S&P and Fitch). Hence, it is clear that rating 
agencies do have impact on financial markets and investors sentiment.  
Having said this, the purpose of this thesis is to understand the importance that the two 
largest rating agencies have on the European markets. While information efficiency has been 
extensively studied in the U.S. market, there is little evidence on the European markets. In this 
sense, the assessment of the price movements over rating actions for companies that belong 
to Euronext 100 index could be a useful sensitivity test for previous studies that are mainly 
based on U.S. companies.  Euronext 100 is composed by the one hundred largest and most 
liquid companies that are traded in Euronext indexes, meaning that there is more information 
reflected on the stock prices, more secured investments and higher level of speculation 
compared to other stocks traded in Euronext. 
This thesis assesses the impact of rating changes and credit watch announcements on stock 
prices for companies that form the Euronext 100 index from the 1st January of 2007 until 31st 
May of 2016. The sample is composed with downgrades, upgrades, positive and negative 
outlook announcements from Moody’s and S&P. Consistently with the previous literature, 
negative abnormal returns are associated with downgrades and positive abnormal returns are 
associated with upgrades (Dichev and Piotroski (2001) and Pinches and Singleton (1978)). On 
the other hand, and inconsistently with previous literature, my results demonstrate that 
downgrade abnormal returns are not significant neither before nor after the announcement, 
while upgrade abnormal returns present significant results before and after the 
announcement. Negative credit watch announcements present immediate significant negative 
results, while positive credit watch signals a delay in the market reaction to the positive news.  
Investment and speculative grades were separately analysed. Investment grade did not 
present significant results while speculative showed high significant abnormal results both for 
downgrades and upgrades, indicating that the market is much more sensitive to rating changes 
when the companies have higher probability of default.  
The global financial crisis had impact on my results. During the crisis period most markets were 
covered in an extreme bearish sentiment, making upgrade announcements useless to cheer 
the markets up and downgrade announcements a new argument to bring the market down. 
Therefore after the crisis period, downgrades did not demonstrate any significant impact on 
stock prices since all the possible risks were already priced in while upgrades gave investor 
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significant reasons to invest. Surprisingly, my results show that announcements of positive and 
negative credit watches had significant opposite expected market reactions.  
The structure is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literatures that were taken 
into consideration in order to make this study; Section 3 presents the data used and 
methodology applied to obtain the results; Section 4 describes and comments the results 
obtained and finally; Section 5 is completed with summary and conclusion.  
 
2. Literature Review 
There are many studies analysing the effects of credit rating changes on stock prices, and the 
results are not consistent finding both mixed effects or no impact on common stocks. Earlier 
studies on the effect of rating changes such as Pinches and Singleton (1978) using a monthly 
data, determined that when bond rating increases, high abnormal returns occur before the 
announcement of the change and after the announcement normal returns are expected. The 
same time, Weinstein (1977) and Wakeman (1978) also using monthly data did not find any 
impact after the announcement of credit changes whereas Katz (1974) concluded that bond 
investors cannot predict rating changes with the price variations and usually announcements 
of such changes are followed by a delayed reaction. These results reflected that investors are 
confident that most of the rating agencies use only the information that are public to assess 
the credit rating, which is available for every investor. However, studies using daily data have 
been more successful capturing impacts than using monthly data. Hand et al. (1992) define the 
average excess returns after rating changes from the periods +61 to +361 days. They implied 
that for downgrades, bond and stock prices react with significant negative average excess 
return and not significant positive average returns for upgrades. They also divide the sample 
into contaminated and non-contaminated samples by observing whether or not news, which 
could indicate a rating change, appeared before the announcement. Non contaminated 
presented even more significant reactions.  Although rating upgrades do not have the same 
impact on average excess returns as rating downgrades, the overall takeaway in their study is 
that announcements of credit rating changes do affect stock prices.  
Some other studies conclude that only downgrades affect the stock price while upgrades do 
not. Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) examined the adjustments in a firm’s common stock price 
during the eleven months before the announcement and one month after. They conclude 
generally there is a significant negative market reaction to bond downgrades, but not to bond 
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upgrades. Notwithstanding, upgraded firms exhibited positive abnormal returns in the 
preceding eleven months.  These findings are consistent with the rationale that downgrades 
provide new information that is not public yet to the equity markets. Steiner and Heinke (2001) 
found that downgrades have a strong negative impact on prices while upgrades do not cause 
announcement effects. Moreover, Ammer and Clinton (2004) used a sample of more than 
1300 changes from the world’s two greatest rating agencies (Moody’s and S&P) and also found 
the impact of credit rating changes on asset-backed securities have significant negative 
reactions to downgrades.  
Kliger and Sarig (2000) tested whether the credit rating agencies have any price relevant 
information that are not public by examining stock price reaction to Moody’s rating changes. In 
the study it was not considered contaminated rating changes which is represented by 
fundamental changes in risk and announcements prior to the rating change. Hereupon, they 
concluded that firm value is not affected by the rating information or changes, but the value of 
debt increases (decreases) while the value of equity decreases (increases) when the rating 
agencies announce better (worse) expected ratings. Plus, Schweitzer et al. (1992) also 
examined whether debt rating changes have inside information that impacts stock prices for 
the banking sector. If rating actions have less impact on banks than corporates, the logic 
behind that would be financial entities are highly regulated, hence the information available is 
much higher than other entities leading to a lower impact on equity value. On the other hand, 
if rating actions have a higher impact on banks than corporates, it would be based on the idea 
that regulators allow financial institutions to withhold some important information from the 
public in order to preserve the stability of the financial system and therefore lead to worsen 
negative abnormal returns associated with banking rating deterioration. In fact, the empirical 
results obtained support the second hypothesis showing that downgrades in the banking 
sector conducts to a stronger effect on the stock price.   
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) also analyses the impact after the rating announcement in a three 
year horizon. They divide the sample into two subgroups whether they relate to the parent 
company or subsidiary. The results do not differ from the previous literatures where the 
downgrades show relevant numbers in all the three years with negative abnormal returns up 
to 14% in the first year following the announcement and even though analysing all Moody’s 
bond rating changes between 1970 and 1997, there is still no significant abnormal returns 
were followed by upgrades. These results are more pronounced for parent companies, small 
firms and lower rated firms.  
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Goh and Ederington (1993) argue that not every downgrade represents bad news for 
shareholders depending on the reasons that led the firm to increase its risk, particularly 
whether such increase was a wealth transfer from the bondholder to the stockholder. The 
authors found that for downgrades due to the deterioration of the financial situation there is a 
significant negative market reaction, while downgrades due to change in leverage do not. The 
same for Gropp and Richards (2001) who focused on a sample of European banks. These 
authors found strong evidence on unexpected rating changes downgrades, but the stock price 
may vary very differently according to the underlying reason.   
More recent literature, Jorion and Zhang (2007) show that studies about rating changes 
announcements should take into consideration the previous and the new ratings. Firms with 
higher ratings have lower credit default probability while firms with lower credit rating have 
higher credit default probability. For example, a downgrade from Aaa to Aa1 should not have 
as much information as a downgrade from Baa3 to Ba1. In the former case, the credit default 
stays at a very low risk while in the latter case becomes a substantial credit risk. Hence in this 
study the authors took in consideration the Investment Grade and Speculative Grade and 
reached the same findings as the previous studies where downgrades involve a much bigger 
change in stock prices than upgrades. Nevertheless, this change is correlated with the previous 
rating in which lower ratings have higher changes due to higher information that affect the 
capital markets. Therefore, asymmetries between downgrade and upgrade information can be 
explained by the prior rating.   
It is clear that earlier studies results differ from the more recent studies results, but every 
study focuses on the information provided by the rating agencies whether they use or not 
inside information to attribute ratings. According to Moody’s Research and Ratings, the 
methodology used for rating differs from industry and company. For each industry, the 
methodology applied has changed over time and nowadays, Moody’s uses quantitative 
analysis such as liquidity, profitability, size and leverage; and qualitative analysis such as 
business position, financial policy, management strategy, corporate governance, financial 
controls and event risk to provide corporate ratings. Moreover, Moody's states that it uses 
confidential non-public information those issuers provide to Moody's only for the purpose of 
assigning ratings. Moody's does not, without the permission of the issuer, disclose the 
information in the press release or other research reports published in connection with the 
rating, or in discussions between Moody's analysts and investors, or other issuers. The same 
applies for S&P (in S&P Global Ratings) as it uses a specific rating framework covering country 
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risk, industry risk, competitive position and financial risk. After determining a preliminary 
rating “anchor” with the previous risks, it will suffer (or not) changes through the “modifiers” 
which include information such as diversification, capital structure, financial policy, liquidity 
and management / governance. To assess issue ratings (more related to bonds), S&P takes into 
consideration the issuer rating, whether it is investment grade or speculative grade, and  
applies an evaluation according to the issue’s priority, company’s asset valuation, jurisdictions 
and recovery percentage in case of default. This information according to S&P, is also obtained 
by the rated company, which might not be available to the public investors yet.  Although 
these two rating agencies are the market leaders, sometimes they do not provide the same 
ratings for the same bond or corporation. Having said this, there is no study that is more 
correct than other. It all depends on the sample, time, rating agency’s methodology used and 
other factors.    
 
3. Data, Sample and Methodology 
I used the stocks that currently compose the Euronext 100 to analyse if credit rating and watch 
list changes affect stock prices. Thereunto, Bloomberg was an essential tool used to collect all 
the data necessary for this study. It is a highly well-known financial database which possesses 
all the information needed such as the changes in credit rating and, Credit Watch and Watch 
List from S&P and Moody’s respectively, the credit rating announcement dates and the returns 
of the stocks and country stocks. This analysis focuses on long term issuer and issue ratings, 
which are the rating agencies opinions over an obligator’s capacity to pay its debt within the 
agreed time. Plus, this study focuses more on stock prices rather than bond prices since there 
is much more information available for stock prices while bond prices may vary according to 
the liquidity and maturity of each issuance. 
3.1 Data and Sample 
Currently Euronext 100 stocks composition is of 100 companies, which are the top 100 largest 
and most liquid stocks traded in all Euronext indexes, from four different countries: Belgium 
(11 firms), France (65 firms), Netherlands (21 firms) and Portugal (3 firms). The rating agencies 
that I took into consideration are the two largest in the rating industry owning together about 
80% of the global market share. According to IMF research1, Moody’s has 40% and Standard & 
Poor’s has also 40%. The period considered is from 2007 until 2016. During this period there 
were 68 companies that suffered a change in their credit ratings, while 29 were either not 




rated by Moody’s or S&P or stopped being rated before 2007 and 3 did not have any change 
during the considered period.  
Table 1 presents an overview about the data selected to be studied. It comprises 361 rating 
announcements and clearly shows a down period as downgrades and provisions of 
downgrading are much higher than upgrades and provisions of upgrade. It seems that the 
global financial crisis in 2008 had a big impact on European firms as the ratio of upgrades to 
downgrades in 2009 following the crisis was 4:35. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone 
between 2011 and 2012 had also clearly strong impact on the rating attribution. Nevertheless, 
in the recent years European companies are showing some stability as rating announcements 
are lower and the number of upgrades is almost matching the number of downgrades.  
Table 1. Credit Rating and Watch list Changes, 2007 – 2016 
Moody’s and S&P have long term issuer ratings, long term issue rating, short term issuer rating, short term issue 
rating and a watch list which includes positive, negative or stable outlooks. In the following table upgrades or 
downgrades are related only to long term ratings. The division between issue rating and issuer rating is  not 














2007 11 4 1 1 17 4,71% 
2008 13 11 6 6 36 9,97% 
2009 4 35 1 12 52 14,40% 
2010 7 10 6 8 31 8,59% 
2011 8 24 4 15 51 14,13% 
2012 11 26 3 10 50 13,85% 
2013 8 10 8 8 34 9,42% 
2014 13 7 3 4 27 7,48% 
2015 12 12 4 8 36 9,97% 
2016 5 14 0 8 27 7,48% 
Total 92 153 36 80 361 100% 
 
In order to avoid any contamination and double counting of the results, it was only considered 
the announcements that respected the following rule: if there are no rating announcements 
two months prior or after the particular announcement, unless the prior or after 
announcements are opposite from the particular announcement (e.g. first a downgrade and 
after an upgrade). The purpose to set this rule is to avoid impacts on stock prices by previous 
announcements that are already priced in and any further announcements will not have any 
abnormal effect on the stock prices. At the same time considering that are considered two 
different rating agencies, this rule will avoid double considerations as there are some 
occasions where both ratings are announced at the same day or within two months difference. 
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With this, the sample was reduced by 70 announcements that do not fulfil the rule mentioned 
above. Now the sample composition for the studied period was as following: 123 downgrades, 
74 upgrades, 25 positive watches and 69 negative watches, totalling 291 announcements.  
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Definition of event study window 
Event studies are a very used analytical tool in financial research (e.g. dividend 
announcements, merger announcements, stock issue, etc.). The purpose of this methodology 
is to determine whether there are any abnormal returns on a given security or a portfolio of 
securities due to a specific event over a period of time.  
According to Peterson (1989), there is not a most correct technique to apply in an event study, 
but many appropriate techniques. I use an event window equal to fifteen trading days (-15) 
before and thirty trading days (30) after the announcement date of the rating change. The fact 
that preceding studies using daily data were more successful capturing impacts than monthly 
data (Hand et al. (1992) and Goh and Ederington (1993)) led me consider a daily window in the 
event study. The chosen window range is small, because a large range would cover other risks 
that are not related to the rating announcement and generating biases. However it is not too 
small in order to capture all the effects of the announcement impact on the stock price 
(Camargos and Barbosa (2003)).  
3.2.2 Cumulative Abnormal Return  
Cumulative abnormal Returns (CAR) are used in my study. It is very commonly used in event 
studies to analyse the effect of external events that might impact on stock prices of a certain 
company or a portfolio of stocks. Goh and Ederington (1993) used event study with a post 
event window of thirty days and cumulative abnormal returns to study the effect of bond 
rating changings on stock prices.  
The first step is to define and determine abnormal returns (AR). I adopt the methodology used 
by Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997) to estimate abnormal returns. The rate of return is 
calculated for each stock i on day t with the logarithm of the price on day t over price on day t 
– 1.  
(1)  Ri, t = ln(Pi, t / Pi, t - 1)   
And the parameter used to compute the abnormal returns is: 
(2)  ARi, t = Ri, t – RIndex, t 
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Where RIndex, t is the market index return on day t. The abnormal return will be computed for all 
the days in my event window from day -15 to day 30. The use of logarithm returns is more 
effective in order to prevent outliers where the returns are very positive or very negative 
which could significantly affect the final result of the study. After obtaining the abnormal 
returns, I used the following equation to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns, 
(3)   CARi, T = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡=0 i, t 
Hereafter, I determined the cumulative abnormal returns for the entire sample and came with 
an average cumulative abnormal return which represented the entire sample that suffered a 
credit rating or watch list change.  
(4)   CARi, T = 
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖=1
𝑁
   
T – statistics significance  
In order to determine whether the results are significant or not it was computed a t-statistics 
significance. The null hypothesis to determine whether the calculated cumulative abnormal 
return is significant or not as follows: 
 H0 : No abnormal return was observed in the Euronext100 stocks prices during the 
event window where credit rating change announcement was made. 
 H1: An abnormal return was observed in the Euronext100 stocks prices during the 
event window where a credit rating change announcement was made. 
The variance of the cumulative abnormal return is: 
(5)   Var( CAR ) = σ2  
Where σ is the standard deviation of the samples average abnormal return and T is the sample 
size used to calculate the cumulative abnormal return. Therefore, the t – stat is computed by the 
following equation (6): 
(6)   T – stat = 
CARi, T
√𝑣𝑎𝑟( CAR )






The results of the estimation of abnormal returns for the samples were reported separately. 
An analysis was made for the subsample of downgrades and upgrades ratings and the 
subsample of positive and negative watch lists. The sample consists of 197 rating changes, of 
which 139 are from France, 28 are from Belgium, 27 are from Netherlands and 7 are from 
Portugal and 94 changes in the watch list with 70 in France, 10 in Belgium, 11 in Netherlands 
and 3 in Portugal. This sample is mainly composed by French companies, because it has the 
largest and most liquid stocks traded on Euronext. I did not analyse all the sample together 
due to the fact that the amount of downgrades and negative credit watch announcements is 
much larger than upgrades and positive credit watch announcements which could return 
biased results. This being said, in the first section I will discuss the impact of rating and credit 
watch changes on stock prices, in the second section I will discuss the same analysis but by 
separating the analysis over Speculative and Investment Grade and finally make an overview of 
the world financial crisis period (2007 – 2010). 
4.1 Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative returns from the first day (-15) to the last day (30) of the event 
study for upgrades, downgrades, positive outlooks and negative outlooks. It presents the 
evolution of cumulative returns from the beginning until the end of the study window (see 
table A2 and A3 on the appendix for more accurate values). For big market capitalizations and 
liquid stocks, the market in average anticipates both rating upgrades and downgrades and 
continues to react after the announcements. The same applies for credit watch 
announcements, but after the announcement the market tends to go the opposite direction. 
Upgrades present linear increases from 15 days before the announcement until 30 days after 
the announcement while downgrades are not as linear as upgrades. The average CAR’s for the 
credit watch are consistent with Pinches and Singleton (1978) credit rating announcement 
findings where abnormal returns are expected before the announcements and normal returns 
are expected after. At the same time, the average CAR’s for rating changes announcements 
before the event (from day -15 to day 0) are also consistent with Pinches and Singleton (1978) 
findings. However, following the announcement, the CAR’s present a continuous increase (or 








The following figure presents the average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) evolution during the event window for downgrades, 
upgrades, positive watches and negative watches. For each day, the presented average CAR is the sum of every average abnormal 
return from the first day (-15) until that day. The starting point is day -16 which was not considered in the analysis and therefore 
takes the value of 0.  
 
Surprisingly, the results obtained in terms of significance differ from most of the previous 
studies meaning that the information provided by the announcement is insufficient to have a 
significant impact on the average CAR. In this study, downgrades announcements are not 
significant while upgrade announcements present significant values (see appendix table A2, 
significant CAR from 2 days before until 30 days after the announcement). It is not given a big 
importance on these results, since the computation of the CAR takes into account both days 
prior and post to the announcement, and for this reason it does not directly reflect the effects 
of the announcements on stock prices. However, it gives some good predictions about the 
possible outcomes of the further results. It is quite difficult to contradict all the previous 
studies whose authors are of high renown, but a fact is that the results obtained show exactly 
the opposite. Prior authors, such as Ederington and Goh (1993), justified that there are 
different market reactions to upgrades and downgrades where positive news for the 
companies are turned public more quickly than negative news and therefore, the impact of the 
good news are priced in earlier. However, these results show exactly the opposite even using 
the same methodology from previous studies. The only difference between my study and 
theirs relies on the different period and sample used. For changes in credit watch the same 
rationale is applied. Negative credit watches do not have significant abnormal returns while 
positive announcements present significant abnormal returns around the announcement day 
(see appendix table A3, 4 days before and after the announcement), showing that positive 


































less impact than positive announcements over the current stage of the company (Upgrade 
announcement).   
Table 2 presents the effects of the rating announcements on stock prices as well as stock 
prices movement before the announcement. Cumulative returns were estimated from 15 days 
before the announcement until the announcement and cumulative return from the 
announcement day until 30 days after. For the period studied, downgrades do not provide any 
negative abnormal returns neither before nor after, while for upgrades the market seems to 
anticipate the announcement fifteen days before the announcement and the announcement 
will have most positive impact on stocks after 2, 13 and 14 days with abnormal results up to 
1%. A possible explanation for this could be that for large companies with liquid stocks, the 
information available is much more abundant than small companies with less liquid stocks, 
where investors can very easily access to it and all the new information that turns public 
reaches the investors in a rapid way and hence, any change in rating would not have a big 
impact on stock prices. Furthermore, during the studied period, investors of large companies 
could have been more optimistic than pessimistic, which justifies the small abnormal return of 
1% for upgrade announcements. 
 On table 3, it is presented the results of the event study, with the same methodology applied 
in table 2, over the effects of credit watch announcements on the stock prices. It shows that 
the market clearly anticipates the outlook announcement with positive abnormal returns of 
3.30% significant at level 99% for positive changes and negative abnormal returns of 1.80% 
significant at level 90% for negative changes. The announcement for the outlook change, will 
also further impact the stock prices in different ways. Negative changes will have further 
abnormal returns at the announcement day and one day after with values down to -1.23% 
with 95% significance, while positive changes will not have any impact in the early days but 
negative abnormal returns after 17 to 25 days with more significant values (at 99%) 21 days 
after the announcement (-2.48%). This indicates that the market reacts shortly to negative 
changes in the outlook, believing that rating agencies bring additional information that is not 
public and companies financial ratios will get worsen in the future and directly hit the stock 
price. On the other hand, the market will react negatively believing that positive future 





Table 2. Upgrades and Downgrades CAR’s 
The following table presents the t-stat results of the cumulative abnormal returns during all the days of the event window 
for downgrades and upgrades. It is composed into two CAR’s groups. One is from day -15 to the announcement day and 
the other one is from the announcement day to the day +30. The table is composed by the day of the t-stat result, the 
standard deviation (STDEV), the average cumulative abnormal results (Average CAR), the number of the sample (N) and 
finally the t-statistics (T-STAT). * means significant at 90%, ** means significant at 95%, *** means significant at 99%. 
  Downgrade Upgrade 
Days STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT   
30 0,20190 -1,12% 123 -0,6132 0,06739 0,78% 74 0,9976   
29 0,19440 -1,19% 123 -0,6771 0,06655 0,75% 74 0,9676   
28 0,18610 -1,35% 123 -0,8017 0,06794 0,81% 74 1,0246   
27 0,17771 -1,00% 123 -0,6271 0,06816 0,55% 74 0,7001   
26 0,18152 -1,23% 123 -0,7545 0,07090 0,59% 74 0,7101   
25 0,18173 -1,33% 123 -0,8108 0,06927 0,37% 74 0,4581   
24 0,17294 -1,60% 123 -1,0256 0,06859 0,54% 74 0,6784   
23 0,16405 -1,44% 123 -0,9743 0,06646 0,59% 74 0,7641   
22 0,16094 -1,22% 123 -0,8429 0,06266 0,73% 74 0,9966   
21 0,16045 -1,05% 123 -0,7252 0,05905 0,72% 74 1,0492   
20 0,15453 -0,69% 123 -0,4976 0,05805 0,49% 74 0,7215   
19 0,15204 -0,65% 123 -0,4750 0,04849 0,86% 74 1,5181   
18 0,15321 -0,85% 123 -0,6154 0,04906 1,01% 74 1,7671 * 
17 0,16182 -0,50% 123 -0,3453 0,05073 0,99% 74 1,6712 * 
16 0,16135 -0,36% 123 -0,2440 0,04884 0,93% 74 1,6318   
15 0,15852 -0,26% 123 -0,1787 0,04639 0,89% 74 1,6501   
14 0,16726 -0,05% 123 -0,0323 0,04248 0,89% 74 1,8009 * 
13 0,15976 0,00% 123 -0,0019 0,03991 0,98% 74 2,1016 ** 
12 0,15225 -0,07% 123 -0,0489 0,04035 1,01% 74 2,1517 ** 
11 0,14684 0,34% 123 0,2534 0,03804 0,49% 74 1,1027   
10 0,14471 0,61% 123 0,4693 0,03920 0,52% 74 1,1416   
9 0,14067 0,70% 123 0,5502 0,03811 0,38% 74 0,8500   
8 0,13276 0,53% 123 0,4412 0,03604 0,40% 74 0,9451   
7 0,14720 0,41% 123 0,3085 0,03641 0,28% 74 0,6669   
6 0,14864 -0,04% 123 -0,0282 0,03742 0,33% 74 0,7555   
5 0,12429 0,10% 123 0,0860 0,03187 0,16% 74 0,4270   
4 0,12421 0,35% 123 0,3082 0,02914 0,35% 74 1,0336   
3 0,06718 0,32% 123 0,5238 0,02356 0,34% 74 1,2400   
2 0,06283 -0,32% 123 -0,5717 0,02238 0,48% 74 1,8593  * 
1 0,05205 -0,38% 123 -0,8155 0,02065 0,11% 74 0,4708   
0 0,03368 0,07% 123 0,2294 0,01513 0,07% 74 0,3977   
-  - - - - - - - - 
 0 0,13007 -1,05% 123 -0,8912 0,05739 1,29% 74 1,9262 * 
-1 0,12204 -1,11% 123 -1,0048 0,05481 1,22% 74 1,9072 * 
-2 0,11757 -1,13% 123 -1,0647 0,04981 1,08% 74 1,8582 * 
-3 0,12738 -1,41% 123 -1,2246 0,05198 1,06% 74 1,7527 * 
-4 0,11099 -1,13% 123 -1,1259 0,05140 0,61% 74 1,0280   
-5 0,09916 -1,34% 123 -1,4971 0,04851 0,77% 74 1,3653   
-6 0,09631 -1,01% 123 -1,1656 0,04783 0,48% 74 0,8629   
-7 0,08418 -0,79% 123 -1,0454 0,04130 0,55% 74 1,1419   
-8 0,07973 -0,91% 123 -1,2596 0,03916 0,57% 74 1,2593   
-9 0,08175 -0,64% 123 -0,8634 0,04173 0,64% 74 1,3113   
-10 0,07362 -0,57% 123 -0,8535 0,03330 0,22% 74 0,5579   
-11 0,06640 -0,14% 123 -0,2322 0,02749 0,21% 74 0,6470   
-12 0,05268 -0,22% 123 -0,4660 0,02494 0,04% 74 0,1521   
-13 0,04844 -0,41% 123 -0,9293 0,02382 0,15% 74 0,5552   
-14 0,03561 -0,10% 123 -0,2990 0,01957 0,07% 74 0,3292   
-15 0,02573 0,06% 123 0,2593 0,01268 0,00% 74 -0,0201   
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Table 3. Positive and Negative Credit Watches CAR’s 
The following table presents the t-stat results of the cumulative abnormal returns during all the days of the event 
window for positive and negative credit watch announcements. It is composed into two CAR’s groups. One is from day -
15 to the announcement day and the other one is from the announcement day to the day +30. The table is composed by 
the day of the t-stat result, the standard deviation (STDEV), the average cumulative abnormal results (Average CAR), the 
number of the sample (N) and finally the t-statistics (T-STAT). * means significant at 90%, ** means significant at 95%, 
*** means significant at 99%. 
  Negative Positive 
Days STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT 
 
STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT   
30 0,12762 1,02% 69 0,6648   0,04613 -0,97% 25 -1,0533   
29 0,12433 0,33% 69 0,2224   0,04739 -1,37% 25 -1,4450   
28 0,13074 -0,07% 69 -0,0438   0,04814 -1,40% 25 -1,4582   
27 0,13602 0,01% 69 0,0061   0,04801 -1,43% 25 -1,4879   
26 0,13936 0,05% 69 0,0279   0,04647 -1,54% 25 -1,6566   
25 0,13963 -0,22% 69 -0,1319   0,05107 -1,94% 25 -1,8994 * 
24 0,13847 -0,70% 69 -0,4206   0,04982 -2,19% 25 -2,1979 ** 
23 0,12990 -0,54% 69 -0,3437   0,04609 -1,97% 25 -2,1341 ** 
22 0,12950 -0,78% 69 -0,4977   0,04668 -2,16% 25 -2,3104 ** 
21 0,12612 -0,91% 69 -0,6019   0,04546 -2,48% 25 -2,7262 *** 
20 0,11055 -0,73% 69 -0,5459   0,04936 -2,39% 25 -2,4260 ** 
19 0,10001 -1,03% 69 -0,8529   0,04804 -2,21% 25 -2,2985 ** 
18 0,09572 -0,98% 69 -0,8523   0,04985 -2,06% 25 -2,0629 ** 
17 0,09525 -0,70% 69 -0,6145   0,04883 -1,74% 25 -1,7780 * 
16 0,09177 -0,55% 69 -0,4973   0,04635 -1,57% 25 -1,6967   
15 0,08847 -0,77% 69 -0,7197   0,04321 -1,30% 25 -1,5035   
14 0,08531 -1,16% 69 -1,1261   0,04119 -1,33% 25 -1,6131   
13 0,07901 -0,52% 69 -0,5484   0,04350 -1,02% 25 -1,1730   
12 0,07611 -0,14% 69 -0,1532   0,04774 -1,10% 25 -1,1545   
11 0,08159 0,04% 69 0,0413   0,04508 -0,75% 25 -0,8296   
10 0,09726 -0,75% 69 -0,6388   0,04251 -0,29% 25 -0,3422   
9 0,09700 -0,61% 69 -0,5254   0,04094 -0,41% 25 -0,4996   
8 0,09083 -0,79% 69 -0,7210   0,04023 -0,49% 25 -0,6060   
7 0,08884 -0,38% 69 -0,3541   0,03741 -0,35% 25 -0,4653   
6 0,08055 -0,93% 69 -0,9607   0,03369 -0,41% 25 -0,6127   
5 0,07333 -0,79% 69 -0,8901   0,03199 0,13% 25 0,2107   
4 0,06973 -0,36% 69 -0,4328   0,02959 0,45% 25 0,7524   
3 0,05737 -0,47% 69 -0,6811   0,02630 0,51% 25 0,9608   
2 0,05394 -0,74% 69 -1,1337   0,01987 0,26% 25 0,6569   
1 0,04734 -1,23% 69 -2,1640 ** 0,02039 0,25% 25 0,6209   
0 0,03701 -0,85% 69 -1,9170 * 0,01991 0,12% 25 0,3069   
- - - - - - - - - - - 
0 0,08743 -1,80% 69 -1,7063 * 0,06220 2,19% 25 1,7597 * 
-1 0,08219 -0,94% 69 -0,9520   0,06272 2,07% 25 1,6477   
-2 0,08408 -0,61% 69 -0,6018   0,06284 3,30% 25 2,6283 *** 
-3 0,08053 -0,65% 69 -0,6742   0,06193 2,68% 25 2,1624 ** 
-4 0,06902 -0,38% 69 -0,4602   0,06094 2,22% 25 1,8216 * 
-5 0,06750 -0,60% 69 -0,7393   0,04979 1,40% 25 1,4071   
-6 0,06690 -0,63% 69 -0,7834   0,04628 1,08% 25 1,1634   
-7 0,06968 -0,36% 69 -0,4315   0,03619 0,86% 25 1,1843   
-8 0,07527 -0,25% 69 -0,2755   0,03382 0,81% 25 1,1992   
-9 0,06206 -0,41% 69 -0,5544   0,03342 0,59% 25 0,8767   
-10 0,06259 -0,81% 69 -1,0811   0,02917 0,38% 25 0,6447   
-11 0,05091 -0,64% 69 -1,0377   0,02246 0,07% 25 0,1497   
-12 0,05087 -0,50% 69 -0,8097   0,02424 0,43% 25 0,8791   
-13 0,04419 -0,34% 69 -0,6378   0,01700 0,36% 25 1,0474   
-14 0,03853 0,04% 69 0,0778   0,01497 -0,27% 25 -0,8983   
-15 0,03047 0,21% 69 0,5698   0,00930 -0,18% 25 -0,9560   
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4.2 Investment and Speculative Grade 
Most of the credit rating announcements in this sample are from companies rated as 
investment grade (89%). Nevertheless, the announcement of rating changes for speculative 
grades is also interesting to be analysed comprising 18 downgrades and 7 upgrades. For 
speculative grades were considered all the rating changes between speculative grades and 
changes from investment grade to speculative grade. However, in this case, it was not 
considered changes in credit watch due to the small size of the sample. Investment grade 
rating changes are composed by 105 downgrades and 67 upgrades. Interestingly, the market 
does not anticipate and also does not react right after the announcement. However (figure 2) 
from day 23 to day 30 of the event, significant (at level 95%) negative cumulative abnormal 
returns different from zero are observed in downgrades (down to -8.0%) and from day 13 until 
day 23 of the event, significant (at between level 95 – 99.9%) positive abnormal returns (up to 
7.13%) different from zero. The average CAR trend for upgrades is quite similar to downgrades, 
but the results are much more significant. In these figures it was not taken into consideration 
the  average CAR’s before the announcement as the purpose is to understand the effects after 
the announcements. 
Figure 2 
The following figure presents the average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) evolution after the rating announcement for 
speculative downgrades, upgrades. It also presents in the figure below the significance of each average cumulative abnormal 































This shows that rating announcements do have impacts on stock prices, but these impacts are 
not immediate, instead it is a progressive deterioration on the investor’s sentiment about the 
company’s financial position and current market value over time. On the other hand, 
investment grade announcements did not present any significant values neither for upgrades 
nor for downgrades. This means that, for large liquid stocks, the announcements of rating 
changes do not bring any news about companies’ financials since the companies are highly 
secured and rating agencies use available data and future projections to determine credit 
ratings. However, for speculative grade companies, markets are more volatile and investors 
believe that rating agencies have privileged information from the companies’ management 
which is not public yet. Another possibility is as described by Jorion and Zhang (2007), many 
investors tend to divest speculative grade stocks and invest investment grade stocks, because 
pension funds and institutional investors often have policies of investing only in investment 
grade companies and when companies turn to speculative grade they have to sell these stocks 
and buy other investment grade equities. 
4.3 Global financial crisis 2007-2010 influence 
Comparing the results above with previous studies, the findings are partially in accordance 
with Jorion and Zhang (2007) where riskier companies have higher and more significant 
abnormal returns, mainly for downgrades, than companies with low risk profile. At the same 
time, it is also interesting the fact that previous related studies such as Dichev and Piotroski 
(2001), Steiner and Heinke (2001), Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) and others, consider 
downgrade announcements as significant modifiers of the stock price and upgrades 
announcements as not significant while the results above, table 2, demonstrates exactly the 
opposite. Therefore, another hypothesis was considered as a justification for this situation: 
The world financial crisis started in 2007. The crisis had most impact during the following three 
years and capital markets tumbled dramatically as investors’ sentiment became highly 
pessimistic. Hence, it is possible that after the crisis, downgrades did not have a significant 
impact since stock prices were mostly underpriced and all the risks were already priced in 
while upgrades gave good news to investors and more confidence about the company 
financials.  
The following analysis, Figure 3, will focus on every rating and outlook announcements during 
the global financial crisis period. In a general overview, all the announcements are quite similar 
to figure 1. During the crisis period, the negative average cumulative return for downgrades 
intensified reaching -9.5% on day 30, upgrades reached 2.06%, positive changes -0.49% and 
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negative changes 1.98%. Nevertheless, like Figure 1 results, these results are also not 
significant at day 30.  
Only downgrades and upgrade ratings announcements had significant results in some days. 
Downgrades had negative CAR’s down to -9.13% 18 days after the announcements 
significantly different from zero at 95% significance while upgrades had positive CAR up to 3.34% 
13 days after the announcements significantly different from zero at 99% significance (see 
table A4 in the appendix).  
Nevertheless these values can explain the market movements around the announcements and 
not their effects on the stock price movements. In that sense, tables 4 and 5, provide stock 
movements during 30 days after the announcement and movements during 15 days before 
the announcement for upgrades and downgrades, and positive and negative credit watches 
respectively.  Each of these two tables provides divided cumulative returns. Cumulative returns 
starting on day 0 until day 30, and cumulative returns starting on day 15 before the 
announcement day until the announcement day are the observed information.     
 
Figure 3 
The following table presents the average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) evolution during the event window for downgrades, 
upgrades, positive watches and negative watches. For each day, the presented average CAR is the sum of every average abnormal 
return from the first day (-15) until that day and the last day is day 30. 
 
From table 4, the market seems to anticipate the rating change announcements reaching 2.84% 
significant positive cumulative abnormal returns at 99% significance for upgrades while 
downgrades reached -4.26% significant negative cumulative abnormal returns at 95% 
significance. After the announcement, upgrades did not have any significant impact on the 
stock prices and its average CAR had been oscillating from negative values to positive and to 




















announcements had impact on the equity values after the announcement only at day 18 with 
negative average CAR of -5.33% significant at 90% significance. At day 30 the results were not 
significant neither for downgrades nor for upgrades which had average CAR’s of respectively -
5.69% and -0.89%.  
From table 5, it is possible to understand that negative change announcements did not 
anticipate and did not have any impact on stock movements after the announcement reaching 
a non-significant positive average CAR of 1.83%, while positive change announcements had 
impact on stock prices from 17 to 26 days after the announcement with more significant 
values on day 24 where the average CAR was significantly -4.49% at 95% significance. 
Nevertheless, it is important to take into account that the size of the sample used on positive 
credit watch changes was only 9. Surprisingly, and looking only into average values, positive 
credit watch changes and negative credit watch changes had completely the opposite  
expected effect as on day 30 negative changes had an average CAR of 1.83% and positive 
changes had an average CAR of -1.68% (both not significant at 90% significance).  
These results are in line with the previous affirmation where the world financial crisis had 
impact on the expected results. Mainly for rating changes, the market could anticipate the 
announcements, but due to the crisis situation upgrades announcements could not trigger 
investors into a bullish mode while downgrades just worsened investor’s sentiment. Therefore, 
after the financial crisis it is probable that downgrades did not affect equity values as stock 
prices were mostly undervalued and all the risks and bad news were priced in. The opposite 











Table 4. Upgrades and Downgrades CAR’s during crisis period 
The following table presents the t-stat results of the cumulative abnormal returns during all the days of the event window 
for downgrades and upgrades during the financial crisis period. It is composed into two CAR’s groups. One is from day -15 
to the announcement day and the other one is from the announcement day to the day +30. The table is composed by the 
day of the t-stat result, the standard deviation (STDEV), the average cumulative abnormal results (Average CAR), the 
number of the sample (N) and finally the t-statistics (T-STAT). * means significant at 90%, ** means significant at 95%, *** 
means significant at 99%. 
  Downgrade Upgrade 
Days STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT   STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT   
30 0,29322 -5,69% 51 -1,3854   0,07633 -0,89% 27 -0,6036   
29 0,28118 -5,83% 51 -1,4809   0,07919 -0,66% 27 -0,4310   
28 0,26685 -5,53% 51 -1,4792   0,08215 -0,53% 27 -0,3328   
27 0,25622 -4,49% 51 -1,2526   0,08027 -0,94% 27 -0,6092   
26 0,26435 -4,63% 51 -1,2506   0,08077 -1,09% 27 -0,6992   
25 0,26608 -4,96% 51 -1,3304   0,07924 -1,14% 27 -0,7508   
24 0,25082 -5,14% 51 -1,4631   0,08079 -1,14% 27 -0,7322   
23 0,23754 -4,71% 51 -1,4150   0,08405 -0,87% 27 -0,5389   
22 0,23366 -4,51% 51 -1,3790   0,07755 -0,51% 27 -0,3433   
21 0,23271 -5,02% 51 -1,5394   0,07475 -0,39% 27 -0,2738   
20 0,22265 -4,63% 51 -1,4865   0,07257 -0,97% 27 -0,6955   
19 0,21857 -4,51% 51 -1,4734   0,05597 -0,12% 27 -0,1115   
18 0,22200 -5,33% 51 -1,7134 * 0,05654 0,12% 27 0,1092   
17 0,23678 -5,14% 51 -1,5500   0,06049 0,17% 27 0,1472   
16 0,23595 -5,02% 51 -1,5192   0,05965 0,44% 27 0,3792   
15 0,23246 -4,88% 51 -1,4985   0,05668 0,18% 27 0,1625   
14 0,24505 -5,23% 51 -1,5252   0,05214 0,01% 27 0,0068   
13 0,23168 -4,94% 51 -1,5213   0,04836 0,40% 27 0,4253   
12 0,22093 -4,52% 51 -1,4618   0,04957 0,33% 27 0,3456   
11 0,21288 -3,84% 51 -1,2878   0,04698 -0,43% 27 -0,4811   
10 0,21208 -3,25% 51 -1,0950   0,04999 -0,22% 27 -0,2314   
9 0,20816 -2,68% 51 -0,9188   0,04805 -0,16% 27 -0,1703   
8 0,19543 -2,07% 51 -0,7553   0,04424 -0,18% 27 -0,2058   
7 0,21976 -1,85% 51 -0,6003   0,04484 -0,42% 27 -0,4813   
6 0,22165 -2,67% 51 -0,8603   0,04571 -0,43% 27 -0,4914   
5 0,18399 -2,08% 51 -0,8081   0,04177 -0,31% 27 -0,3908   
4 0,18436 -1,60% 51 -0,6209   0,03884 0,01% 27 0,0089   
3 0,09149 0,93% 51 0,7274   0,02883 -0,05% 27 -0,0897   
2 0,08461 0,03% 51 0,0238   0,02513 0,17% 27 0,3504   
1 0,06961 -0,83% 51 -0,8556   0,02404 -0,01% 27 -0,0318   
0 0,04165 -0,46% 51 -0,7846   0,01628 -0,10% 27 -0,3310   
-  - - - - - - - - - - 
0 0,16828 -4,26% 51 -1,8088 ** 0,05833 2,84% 27 2,5341 *** 
-1 0,16260 -3,80% 51 -1,6710 * 0,05502 2,95% 27 2,7845 *** 
-2 0,15641 -3,05% 51 -1,3940   0,05078 2,18% 27 2,2292 ** 
-3 0,18053 -3,14% 51 -1,2431   0,05964 2,23% 27 1,9439 ** 
-4 0,14981 -2,44% 51 -1,1632   0,05758 1,60% 27 1,4455 * 
-5 0,12209 -1,78% 51 -1,0383   0,05440 1,91% 27 1,8211 ** 
-6 0,11281 -0,95% 51 -0,6034   0,05760 1,59% 27 1,4320 * 
-7 0,09453 -0,52% 51 -0,3930   0,04978 1,70% 27 1,7715 ** 
-8 0,09744 -1,07% 51 -0,7871   0,05140 1,61% 27 1,6251 * 
-9 0,09449 -0,83% 51 -0,6310   0,05342 1,99% 27 1,9320 ** 
-10 0,07359 -0,68% 51 -0,6643   0,04327 1,11% 27 1,3370 * 
-11 0,06585 0,08% 51 0,0815   0,03040 0,89% 27 1,5170 * 
-12 0,04987 0,02% 51 0,0320   0,02881 0,56% 27 1,0186   
-13 0,04696 -0,23% 51 -0,3546   0,02847 0,62% 27 1,1259   
-14 0,04019 -0,31% 51 -0,5520   0,02247 0,69% 27 1,5959 * 
-15 0,03291 0,12% 51 0,2693   0,01533 -0,05% 27 -0,1857   
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Table 5. Positive and Negatives Watches CAR’s during crisis period  
The following table presents the t-stat results of the cumulative abnormal returns during all the days of the event 
window for positive and negative credit watch announcements during the financial crisis period. It is composed into two 
CAR’s groups. One is from day -15 to the announcement day and the other one is from the announcement day to the day 
+30. The table is composed by the day of the t-stat result, the standard deviation (STDEV), the average cumulative 
abnormal results (Average CAR), the number of the sample (N) and finally the t-statistics (T-STAT). * means significant at 
90%, ** means significant at 95%, *** means significant at 99%. 
 
Negative Positive 
Days STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT   STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT   
30 0,18711 1,83% 24 0,4782   0,04541 -1,68% 9 -1,1122   
29 0,17451 0,88% 24 0,2460   0,04250 -2,12% 9 -1,4983   
28 0,18440 0,37% 24 0,0974   0,04702 -2,38% 9 -1,5169   
27 0,19780 0,37% 24 0,0920   0,04726 -2,50% 9 -1,5887   
26 0,20661 0,57% 24 0,1359   0,04731 -3,08% 9 -1,9512 * 
25 0,20639 -0,46% 24 -0,1084   0,05873 -3,90% 9 -1,9925 * 
24 0,19810 -1,12% 24 -0,2760   0,05524 -4,49% 9 -2,4379 ** 
23 0,18104 -0,68% 24 -0,1830   0,05542 -3,21% 9 -1,7402   
22 0,18147 -1,43% 24 -0,3861   0,05214 -3,34% 9 -1,9214 * 
21 0,17543 -2,50% 24 -0,6981   0,04887 -3,45% 9 -2,1182 * 
20 0,14942 -1,46% 24 -0,4790   0,05163 -3,68% 9 -2,1364 * 
19 0,13442 -2,35% 24 -0,8559   0,04640 -3,15% 9 -2,0400 * 
18 0,12263 -2,37% 24 -0,9476   0,04738 -3,64% 9 -2,3029 ** 
17 0,12347 -1,89% 24 -0,7498   0,04872 -3,02% 9 -1,8628 * 
16 0,11746 -1,78% 24 -0,7410   0,04436 -2,05% 9 -1,3885   
15 0,10950 -2,46% 24 -1,1021   0,03486 -2,15% 9 -1,8481   
14 0,10867 -3,37% 24 -1,5187   0,03677 -1,70% 9 -1,3878   
13 0,09986 -2,58% 24 -1,2659   0,03917 -1,31% 9 -1,0060   
12 0,09814 -2,11% 24 -1,0521   0,04499 -1,80% 9 -1,2032   
11 0,11154 -1,64% 24 -0,7217   0,04058 -2,18% 9 -1,6101   
10 0,14201 -2,81% 24 -0,9684   0,03758 -1,62% 9 -1,2966   
9 0,14852 -2,72% 24 -0,8975   0,04313 -1,56% 9 -1,0818   
8 0,13561 -2,29% 24 -0,8285   0,04015 -1,83% 9 -1,3703   
7 0,13307 -2,04% 24 -0,7518   0,03800 -1,13% 9 -0,8931   
6 0,11581 -2,60% 24 -1,0995   0,03680 -1,47% 9 -1,1946   
5 0,10317 -2,41% 24 -1,1441   0,03482 -0,49% 9 -0,4196   
4 0,10166 -1,35% 24 -0,6527   0,02673 -0,24% 9 -0,2746   
3 0,08197 -1,54% 24 -0,9205   0,02732 0,22% 9 0,2409   
2 0,07903 -1,98% 24 -1,2262   0,02195 0,09% 9 0,1176   
1 0,06956 -2,37% 24 -1,6660   0,01831 -0,23% 9 -0,3803   
0 0,05347 -2,01% 24 -1,8412   0,01561 -0,60% 9 -1,1605   
                      
0 0,11739 -1,85% 24 -0,7725   0,05471 0,59% 9 0,3251   
-1 0,10099 0,16% 24 0,0769   0,05582 1,20% 9 0,6430   
-2 0,10895 -0,11% 24 -0,0476   0,05571 3,30% 9 1,7775   
-3 0,10705 0,28% 24 0,1287   0,05839 1,58% 9 0,8127   
-4 0,08571 0,38% 24 0,2156   0,05587 0,79% 9 0,4259   
-5 0,09475 -0,19% 24 -0,0982   0,04972 0,95% 9 0,5703   
-6 0,09021 -0,47% 24 -0,2547   0,04495 0,86% 9 0,5730   
-7 0,08784 0,57% 24 0,3157   0,04056 0,62% 9 0,4567   
-8 0,10076 1,47% 24 0,7167   0,04038 0,75% 9 0,5562   
-9 0,08072 1,10% 24 0,6679   0,03367 0,53% 9 0,4751   
-10 0,08534 0,82% 24 0,4731   0,02917 1,05% 9 1,0800   
-11 0,05885 0,51% 24 0,4229   0,02296 0,70% 9 0,9128   
-12 0,05766 0,71% 24 0,6053   0,02586 1,25% 9 1,4537   
-13 0,03746 0,48% 24 0,6214   0,01741 0,85% 9 1,4621   
-14 0,03593 0,75% 24 1,0168   0,01345 0,22% 9 0,4952   
-15 0,03658 1,24% 24 1,6568   0,00823 -0,13% 9 -0,4730   
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Finally, an analysis over the period following the global financial crisis. The results are partially 
in accordance with the prior hypothesis, where positive news would have had good impact on 
stocks movement while bad news would not have had much impact on stocks movement.  
Table 6. Downgrades and Upgrades CAR after crisis period 
The following table presents the t-stat results of the cumulative abnormal returns during all the days of the event 
window for downgrades and upgrades after the financial crisis period. The average CAR’s are from the announcement 
day to the day +30. The table is composed by the day of the t-stat result, the standard deviation (STDEV), the average 
cumulative abnormal results (Average CAR), the number of the sample (N) and finally the t-statistics (T-STAT). * means 
significant at 90%, ** means significant at 95%, *** means significant at 99%. 
  Downgrade Upgrade 
Days STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT   STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT   
30 0,09047 -0,11% 72 -0,1053   0,06048 1,74% 47 1,9723 * 
29 0,08841 0,03% 72 0,0264   0,05746 1,56% 47 1,8565   
28 0,09017 -0,12% 72 -0,1086   0,05785 1,58% 47 1,8680 * 
27 0,08503 -0,13% 72 -0,1308   0,05937 1,41% 47 1,6329   
26 0,08174 -0,47% 72 -0,4919   0,06350 1,55% 47 1,6689   
25 0,07791 -0,53% 72 -0,5797   0,06208 1,24% 47 1,3678   
24 0,07887 -0,60% 72 -0,6407   0,05930 1,51% 47 1,7406 * 
23 0,07626 -0,65% 72 -0,7244   0,05310 1,43% 47 1,8464 * 
22 0,07294 -0,32% 72 -0,3670   0,05186 1,44% 47 1,8998 * 
21 0,07047 0,17% 72 0,2044   0,04754 1,36% 47 1,9615 * 
20 0,07044 0,62% 72 0,7517   0,04662 1,32% 47 1,9479 * 
19 0,07073 0,56% 72 0,6680   0,04327 1,42% 47 2,2439 ** 
18 0,06431 0,63% 72 0,8270   0,04405 1,52% 47 2,3634 ** 
17 0,06325 0,86% 72 1,1583   0,04420 1,45% 47 2,2537 ** 
16 0,06385 0,85% 72 1,1294   0,04186 1,21% 47 1,9794 * 
15 0,06091 0,92% 72 1,2798   0,03939 1,30% 47 2,2609 ** 
14 0,06396 1,11% 72 1,4775   0,03544 1,40% 47 2,7017 *** 
13 0,06679 1,23% 72 1,5605   0,03428 1,31% 47 2,6157 *** 
12 0,06489 0,92% 72 1,2008   0,03394 1,40% 47 2,8272 *** 
11 0,06345 1,30% 72 1,7354 * 0,03115 1,02% 47 2,2395 ** 
10 0,05861 1,30% 72 1,8785 ** 0,03123 0,95% 47 2,0790 * 
9 0,05381 1,08% 72 1,6960   0,03120 0,68% 47 1,5013   
8 0,05555 0,62% 72 0,9542   0,03041 0,72% 47 1,6324   
7 0,05535 0,09% 72 0,1403   0,03036 0,68% 47 1,5422   
6 0,05597 -0,32% 72 -0,4811   0,03142 0,77% 47 1,6710   
5 0,05046 -0,15% 72 -0,2600   0,02460 0,43% 47 1,1969   
4 0,04958 0,04% 72 0,0694   0,02200 0,55% 47 1,7057 * 
3 0,04288 0,23% 72 0,4520   0,01993 0,56% 47 1,9378 * 
2 0,04169 -0,20% 72 -0,4096   0,02071 0,66% 47 2,1992 ** 
1 0,03473 0,10% 72 0,2326   0,01866 0,19% 47 0,6846   
0 0,02636 0,43% 72 1,3758   0,01452 0,17% 47 0,8015   
From table 6, which presents the average CAR’s after the announcement day until day 30 after 
the crisis period, it is possible to observe that upgrade announcements have positive impact on 
stock prices during all the average CAR’s days with more significant values on day 14 where the 
average CAR was 1.4% with 99% significance. At the same time, after downgrade 
announcements, the average CAR’s oscillates positively and negatively only with significant 




4.4 Financial and Non-financial Firms  
During the global financial crisis, the financial sector was the most affected. In that sense, I also 
decided to separate my sample between the financial and non-financial companies. Although I 
had to discard credit watch announcements due to its small sample size, I will consider the 
time division between financial and non-financial crisis period. Therefore, it is a comparison 
between the effects of rating agencies on financial and non-financial stocks taking into account 
the global financial crisis. Previous related studies such as Schweitzer et al. (1992) and Gropp 
and Richards (2001), find that financial stock prices may vary depending on the underlying 
reasons. However, they conclude that unexpected rating downgrades have significant negative 
abnormal returns, which supports the hypothesis that regulators allow financial institutions to 
withhold some important information to be public in order to preserve the stability of the 
financial system and therefore, leads to a worse negative abnormal returns associated with 
banking rating deterioration. Overall the financial companies, although downgrades have high 
negative average cumulative abnormal returns reaching -8.0% (see table A5 in appendix), they 
are not significant at 90% significance. On the other hand, upgrades  have significant returns 
but very low average abnormal cumulative returns of 0.91% two days after the rating 
announcement. Before the announcements, the market behaves naturally without significant 
abnormal returns. For non-financial firms (see table A6 in appendix) the market follow the 
same trend as the values from all the sample (see table 2), which can be explained by the 
disproportional sample of 73% of non-financial firms announcements and only 27% of financial 
firms announcements.  
The tables 7 and 8, which present the CAR’s of upgrades and downgrades during and after the 
world financial crisis for financial and non-financial companies respectively, follow the same 
pattern as previous tables 2 and 4 where are divided into two groups of cumulative abnormal 
returns, before and after the announcement, to understand how markets move before the 
unexpected rating announcement and how markets absorb the new information that rating 
agencies provide with rating announcements. For financial firms (Table 7) during the crisis 
period, downgrade announcements led to an average cumulative abnormal return after 30 
days of -4.77% with its record high after 13 days of -6.41%. Nonetheless, these results are not 
significant meaning that most of the financial firms followed the market trends. Before the 
upgrades announcements, the market seems to be able to absorb new information before the 
rating announcement reaching 4.10% average abnormal returns 15 days before with 
significant results at a significance level of 90%, and after the announcement the market still 
reacts positively until day 2 with positive returns of 1.59% significant at a level of 95% 
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significance. Thereafter, the price of stocks had negative abnormal returns until day 20 with an 
average CAR of -2.55% significant at 90% level. Interestingly, after the crisis period, downgrade 
announcements brought new information to the market as financial stocks suffer significant 
negative average CAR’s, between -1.72% to -2.77%,  early after 2 to 5 days and later after 22 to 
26 days, between -3.41% to -4.39%, all significant at 95%. Comparing to downgrade results on 
table 7, table 8 shows that financial firms react differently from non-financial firms when it 
comes to these announcements. As for upgrade announcements, financial stocks have 
negative average CAR’s since several days before until the event day with high significance 
levels, but following the announcements, stocks follow the market trends meaning that 
upgrades were not enough to provide good news and/or all the reasons for rating upgrade 
were already public and priced in.  
Non-financial firms had different behaviour after the crisis period and similar behaviour during 
the crisis period. Like financial stocks, non-financial equities have non-significant negative 
average CAR’s before and after downgrades with less average abnormal returns observed, and 
also significant average CAR’s few days before the event day of 2.40% significant at 95%. After 
the critical period, non-financial corporates showed a different reaction to rating changes as 
downgrades, in table 8, have positive returns after the announcements up to 1.43% at 90% 
significance and as upgrades, also similar to table 6, have very significant positive average 
CAR’s since the second day after the event until the last day of the window with results ranging 
from 0.67% to 2.48%.  
This shows that the information released by rating agencies impacts more the financial sector 
rather than non-financial sector. It can be explained by the fact that regulators allow banks to 
withhold some important information in order to preserve the stability of the market. 
However, it is interesting to see that for upgrades financial equities have significant negative 
abnormal returns before and normal returns after the announcement, while for downgrades 
financial stocks have normal returns before and significant negative abnormal returns after the 
announcement. Although the effects are similar to previous studies, where the 
announcements have impact on the stock prices, the market seemed to have had 
misunderstood the available information (significant negative returns prior to upgrades and no 
significant abnormal returns prior to downgrades). Nevertheless, it has to be taken into 
consideration once again the fact that the sample to study the financial firms before and after 




Table 7. Financial Companies CAR Results 
The following table presents the t-stat results of the cumulative abnormal returns during all the days of the event window for downgrades and 
upgrades of financial companies during and after the financial crisis period. The average CAR’s are from the announcement day to the day +30. 
The table is composed by the day of the t-stat result), the average cumulative abnormal results (Average CAR), the number of the sample (N) and 
finally the t-statistics (T-STAT). * means significant at 90%, ** means significant at 95%, *** means significant at 99%. 
  Crisis Period Non Crisis Period 
  Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade 
Days 
Average 
CAR N t-stat 
 
Average 
CAR N t-stat 
 
Average 
CAR N t-stat 
 
Average 
CAR N T-STAT 
 30 -4,77% 17 -0,721   -1,83% 7 -0,691   -2,14% 19 -1,292   -1,01% 10 -0,550   
29 -5,97% 17 -0,899   -1,27% 7 -0,482   -1,87% 19 -1,189   -0,98% 10 -0,573   
28 -5,46% 17 -0,821   -1,06% 7 -0,398   -2,46% 19 -1,438   -0,56% 10 -0,336   
27 -2,79% 17 -0,450   -1,72% 7 -0,749   -3,02% 19 -1,651   -1,08% 10 -0,717   
26 -3,24% 17 -0,484   -2,12% 7 -0,954   -3,95% 19 -2,203 ** -1,44% 10 -0,968   
25 -2,73% 17 -0,419   -2,23% 7 -1,505   -4,04% 19 -2,788 ** -1,58% 10 -1,071   
24 -3,46% 17 -0,549   -2,17% 7 -1,289   -4,29% 19 -2,667 ** -1,72% 10 -1,201   
23 -3,75% 17 -0,594   -1,18% 7 -0,609   -4,39% 19 -2,688 ** -1,01% 10 -0,705   
22 -3,77% 17 -0,589   -1,21% 7 -0,708   -3,41% 19 -2,135 ** -0,82% 10 -0,576   
21 -4,45% 17 -0,712   -1,37% 7 -1,054   -2,07% 19 -1,263   -0,05% 10 -0,034   
20 -3,71% 17 -0,564   -2,55% 7 -2,207 * -0,57% 19 -0,345   0,10% 10 0,066   
19 -2,92% 17 -0,475   -2,28% 7 -1,609   -1,12% 19 -0,670   0,68% 10 0,399   
18 -4,97% 17 -0,850   -1,63% 7 -0,919   -1,21% 19 -0,956   1,14% 10 0,658   
17 -5,24% 17 -0,882   -0,56% 7 -0,250   -0,67% 19 -0,499   1,51% 10 0,859   
16 -4,38% 17 -0,780   -0,72% 7 -0,337   -0,17% 19 -0,116   1,29% 10 0,872   
15 -4,24% 17 -0,898   -1,43% 7 -0,857   0,38% 19 0,251   0,91% 10 0,768   
14 -5,86% 17 -1,056   -2,20% 7 -1,862   0,59% 19 0,356   0,60% 10 0,485   
13 -6,41% 17 -1,107   -1,25% 7 -1,123   1,55% 19 0,858   0,11% 10 0,088   
12 -5,53% 17 -1,008   -1,32% 7 -1,132   0,98% 19 0,546   -0,42% 10 -0,394   
11 -3,50% 17 -0,683   -0,92% 7 -1,096   1,58% 19 0,934   -0,76% 10 -0,705   
10 -2,35% 17 -0,491   -0,81% 7 -0,884   1,43% 19 1,191   -0,83% 10 -0,862   
9 -1,11% 17 -0,245   -0,91% 7 -0,860   0,54% 19 0,494   -0,82% 10 -0,707   
8 -0,37% 17 -0,088   -0,70% 7 -0,812   -1,33% 19 -1,196   -0,83% 10 -0,815   
7 0,79% 17 0,199   0,02% 7 0,017   -1,28% 19 -0,978   -1,03% 10 -1,061   
6 -0,68% 17 -0,182   -0,18% 7 -0,169   -2,41% 19 -1,650   -0,61% 10 -0,668   
5 0,27% 17 0,098   0,56% 7 0,554   -2,77% 19 -2,462 ** -0,92% 10 -1,124   
4 1,37% 17 0,485   0,85% 7 1,013   -2,62% 19 -2,435 ** -0,35% 10 -0,458   
3 1,40% 17 0,456   0,74% 7 0,810   -1,72% 19 -2,289 ** 0,17% 10 0,242   
2 -0,80% 17 -0,282   1,59% 7 2,418 **  -2,11% 19 -2,847 ** 0,42% 10 0,761   
1 -2,25% 17 -0,985   1,18% 7 1,349   -0,82% 19 -1,683   0,02% 10 0,051   
0 -1,77% 17 -1,264   0,82% 7 1,445   0,17% 19 0,255   0,24% 10 0,634   
                                  
0 -5,96% 17 -1,166   4,10% 7 2,342 * 3,37% 19 1,199   -2,61% 10 -2,242 ** 
-1 -4,19% 17 -0,871   3,28% 7 2,020 * 3,20% 19 1,248   -2,85% 10 -2,445 ** 
-2 -3,23% 17 -0,582   3,54% 7 2,343 * 1,28% 19 0,452   -2,17% 10 -2,465 ** 
-3 -6,14% 17 -0,847   4,30% 7 2,041 * 0,83% 19 0,366   -2,34% 10 -2,248 ** 
-4 -4,62% 17 -0,780   3,84% 7 1,836   0,80% 19 0,321   -2,08% 10 -2,231 ** 
-5 -3,08% 17 -0,643   3,00% 7 1,694   -0,32% 19 -0,110   -1,91% 10 -2,287 ** 
-6 0,05% 17 0,013   3,80% 7 1,812   -0,17% 19 -0,055   -2,12% 10 -4,056 *** 
-7 -0,11% 17 -0,031   3,40% 7 1,747   -0,39% 19 -0,143   -1,95% 10 -4,063 *** 
-8 -1,01% 17 -0,293   3,84% 7 1,616   -0,34% 19 -0,149   -1,19% 10 -2,518 ** 
-9 -1,23% 17 -0,418   5,15% 7 1,707   -0,25% 19 -0,090   -0,76% 10 -1,142   
-10 -0,08% 17 -0,043   3,90% 7 1,667   -0,55% 19 -0,188   -1,03% 10 -1,574   
-11 1,35% 17 0,806   2,08% 7 1,252   -0,34% 19 -0,132   -0,86% 10 -1,424   
-12 1,25% 17 0,964   1,47% 7 0,900   0,03% 19 0,013   -0,85% 10 -1,902   
-13 0,45% 17 0,323   1,98% 7 1,137   0,28% 19 0,152   -0,45% 10 -1,089   
-14 0,76% 17 0,581   1,90% 7 1,526   0,69% 19 0,642   -0,81% 10 -2,005   
-15 0,72% 17 0,647   -0,96% 7 -1,357   0,34% 19 0,526   -0,47% 10 -2,300   
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Table 8. Non-Financial Companies CAR Results 
The following table presents the t-stat results of the cumulative abnormal returns during all the days of the event window for downgrades and 
upgrades of non-financial companies during and after the financial crisis period. The average CAR’s are from the announcement day to the day 
+30. The table is composed by the day of the t-stat result, the average cumulative abnormal results (Average CAR), the number of the sample 
(N) and finally the t-statistics (T-STAT). * means significant at 90%, ** means significant at 95%, *** means significant at 99%. 
  Crisis Period Non Crisis Period 
  Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade 
Days 
Avg. 
CAR N t-stat 
 
Avg. 
CAR N t-stat 
 
Avg. 
CAR N t-stat 
 
Avg. 
CAR N t-stat 
 30 -1,66% 33 -0,675   -0,56% 20 -0,312   0,68% 54 0,528   2,48% 37 2,532 ** 
29 -1,52% 33 -0,688   -0,44% 20 -0,236   0,77% 54 0,603   2,24% 37 2,385 ** 
28 -1,69% 33 -0,760   -0,34% 20 -0,174   0,77% 54 0,601   2,16% 37 2,246 ** 
27 -1,58% 33 -0,698   -0,67% 20 -0,343   0,95% 54 0,829   2,09% 37 2,083 ** 
26 -1,53% 33 -0,674   -0,72% 20 -0,367   0,82% 54 0,763   2,35% 37 2,185 ** 
25 -2,18% 33 -0,929   -0,77% 20 -0,382   0,77% 54 0,720   2,00% 37 1,902 * 
24 -2,39% 33 -1,079   -0,78% 20 -0,383   0,77% 54 0,732   2,38% 37 2,405 ** 
23 -1,99% 33 -0,901   -0,76% 20 -0,364   0,72% 54 0,722   2,09% 37 2,367 ** 
22 -1,88% 33 -0,833   -0,27% 20 -0,137   0,83% 54 0,857   2,05% 37 2,375 ** 
21 -2,45% 33 -1,042   -0,05% 20 -0,028   1,06% 54 1,137   1,74% 37 2,203 ** 
20 -2,67% 33 -1,146   -0,42% 20 -0,228   1,11% 54 1,167   1,66% 37 2,177 ** 
19 -2,68% 33 -1,189   0,64% 20 0,474   1,19% 54 1,267   1,62% 37 2,419 ** 
18 -2,63% 33 -1,193   0,73% 20 0,551   1,31% 54 1,457   1,62% 37 2,376 ** 
17 -1,76% 33 -0,829   0,43% 20 0,307   1,43% 54 1,648 * 1,44% 37 2,107 ** 
16 -1,79% 33 -0,883   0,84% 20 0,609   1,21% 54 1,418   1,19% 37 1,755 * 
15 -1,45% 33 -0,735   0,74% 20 0,546   1,12% 54 1,397   1,40% 37 2,118 ** 
14 -1,10% 33 -0,578   0,78% 20 0,618   1,31% 54 1,580   1,61% 37 2,830 *** 
13 -0,79% 33 -0,445   0,97% 20 0,823   1,12% 54 1,324   1,63% 37 3,045 *** 
12 -0,68% 33 -0,417   0,91% 20 0,750   0,89% 54 1,095   1,89% 37 3,519 *** 
11 -0,69% 33 -0,440   -0,27% 20 -0,223   1,19% 54 1,471   1,50% 37 3,138 *** 
10 -0,24% 33 -0,160   -0,02% 20 -0,013   1,25% 54 1,515   1,43% 37 2,890 *** 
9 0,06% 33 0,046   0,11% 20 0,089   1,26% 54 1,662 * 1,09% 37 2,312 ** 
8 0,47% 33 0,378   0,01% 20 0,009   1,30% 54 1,702 *  1,15% 37 2,412 ** 
7 0,82% 33 0,628   -0,57% 20 -0,505   0,62% 54 0,837   1,15% 37 2,413 ** 
6 0,36% 33 0,285   -0,52% 20 -0,456   0,48% 54 0,694   1,14% 37 2,200 ** 
5 0,15% 33 0,132   -0,62% 20 -0,602   0,80% 54 1,237   0,79% 37 2,071 ** 
4 0,37% 33 0,333   -0,29% 20 -0,298   1,01% 54 1,574   0,79% 37 2,282 ** 
3 -0,02% 33 -0,017   -0,32% 20 -0,478   0,93% 54 1,557   0,67% 37 2,088 ** 
2 -0,37% 33 -0,428   -0,33% 20 -0,570   0,48% 54 0,829   0,73% 37 2,050 ** 
1 -0,67% 33 -0,786   -0,43% 20 -0,828   0,41% 54 0,793   0,23% 37 0,713   
0 0,01% 33 0,022   -0,43% 20 -1,206   0,50% 54 1,455   0,15% 37 0,600   
                                  
0 -1,77% 33 -0,953   2,40% 20 1,722 *  0,47% 54 0,478   1,20% 37 1,276   
-1 -1,78% 33 -1,075   2,83% 20 2,124 ** -0,03% 54 -0,041   1,05% 37 1,191   
-2 -1,69% 33 -1,203   1,70% 20 1,406   -0,10% 54 -0,141   1,15% 37 1,371   
-3 -1,00% 33 -0,762   1,51% 20 1,111   -0,49% 54 -0,692   1,12% 37 1,449   
-4 -0,86% 33 -0,677   0,82% 20 0,635   -0,53% 54 -0,734   0,62% 37 0,760   
-5 -0,73% 33 -0,661   1,52% 20 1,187   -1,25% 54 -1,628   0,67% 37 0,871   
-6 -1,02% 33 -0,909   0,81% 20 0,631   -1,34% 54 -1,703   0,37% 37 0,524   
-7 -0,29% 33 -0,270   1,10% 20 1,003   -1,18% 54 -1,560   0,38% 37 0,639   
-8 -0,51% 33 -0,464   0,83% 20 0,803   -0,93% 54 -1,409   0,30% 37 0,576   
-9 0,03% 33 0,026   0,88% 20 1,052   -0,57% 54 -0,921   0,03% 37 0,053   
-10 -0,52% 33 -0,434   0,14% 20 0,200   -0,43% 54 -0,744   -0,10% 37 -0,241   
-11 -0,32% 33 -0,284   0,47% 20 0,870   -0,24% 54 -0,426   0,00% 37 -0,004   
-12 -0,47% 33 -0,547   0,25% 20 0,495   -0,54% 54 -1,123   -0,09% 37 -0,240   
-13 -0,52% 33 -0,685   0,14% 20 0,335   -0,80% 54 -1,762   -0,02% 37 -0,057   
-14 -0,85% 33 -1,479   0,27% 20 0,720   -0,15% 54 -0,441   -0,14% 37 -0,463   
-15 -0,22% 33 -0,504   0,26% 20 0,897   -0,05% 54 -0,233   0,16% 37 0,832   
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5. Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the stock market behavior to explain the magnitude 
of investors’ reaction to rating agency news. The announcements of rating and Credit Watch 
changes were gathered from Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s during 2007 – 2016 from 
companies that form the current Euronext 100 index. Using this data, I examined returns using 
cumulative abnormal returns to measure investor’s reaction to news.  
The results are not consistent with much of international literature as I did not find significant 
negative results for downgrades even though the average cumulative abnormal returns were 
negative. There is no significant reaction neither before nor after the announcement. On the 
other hand, upgrades had low positive average cumulative abnormal returns but very 
significant before and after the announcement. These results contradicts previous studies 
conclusions where good news tend to be released immediately while downgrades bring more 
information as rating agencies make much more effort in the search for undisclosed 
information which supports downgrades. Nevertheless, dividing the sample into investment 
and speculative grade, the results become different as both speculative downgrades and 
upgrades have significant negative and positive average cumulative returns respectively. 
Meaning that for speculative grades, rating agencies bring much more unrevealed information 
to investors, which is quite reasonable since rating agencies have to take a much closer look on 
the firms where the probability of default is higher. Reaction over investment grade companies 
takes a similar trend as the overall results. 
I also noted that for outlook changes, the results for negative changes are more significant 
than downgrade announcements. The market anticipates the announcement and continues to 
react until 2 days after the announcement which might indicate that besides the disclosed bad 
information, investors trust rating agencies future forecasts leading to a negative reaction. 
Positive outlook changes are also anticipated by the market but instead of a positive trend 
after the announcement, the market takes significant negative average cumulative returns. 
This could be explained that good news released before the announcement were not enough 
to increase the creditworthiness of the company as the rating agency only attribute a positive 
outlook making investors believe that market is overvalued.  
Analysis at the global financial crisis period and after was considered to see if there is any 
possible explanation for such different results comparing to most of the international 
literatures. During the crisis period, the financial market turned extremely bearish with 
dramatic falls on the stock prices. Downgrades presented significant negative results before 
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and after the announcement while upgrades only presented significant positive results before 
and non-relevant average CAR’s results after the announcement. After the crisis period, 
downgrades did not have any impact on stocks while upgrades had significant positive average 
cumulative abnormal returns after the announcement. This could explain why my results differ 
from other studies. The financial crisis had huge impact on financial markets where indexes 
drastically fell and hence after the financial crises downgrades did not make any significant 
impact since the stock prices were mostly underpriced and all the risk and bad news were 
already priced in. On the other hand, upgrades were porters of good news providing good 
reasons for investors to invest.  
Finally, I further divided the sample into financial and non-financial firms and found out that 
financial firms behave differently. Whereas non-financial firms follow the same pattern as the 
agglomerate sample during and after the global financial crisis, financial firms have similar 
results as previous studies where downgrades have significant negative abnormal returns 
while upgrades have no significant abnormal returns after the global financial crisis. Therefore, 
the information provided is much more effective on financial than non-financial firms.  
I conclude that rating agencies do bring new information with its announcements, but the 
market may not react accordingly. Like John Maynard Keynes said, successful investments 
require each investor to guess what other investors will do; it is like a beauty contest game in 
which each contestant tries to predict which model other participants will consider most 
beautiful. Therefore, stock prices depend on the majority of investors’ sentiment in which 
rating agencies might change or not. From my study, for different times, sectors and credit 
quality, the rating announcements produce different reactions. Although rating changes do 
have news that were not disclosed, investors should not only rely on such information and try 










6. Limitations and Future Research 
Like many other papers, this dissertation also faced limitations. Concerning the sample and the 
data collected from Bloomberg, mainly dates of ratings or credit watches changes, the 
information was manually copied to the excel sheet which might have some typing mistakes 
due to the large number of the two agency announcements during the studied period. The 
reason for doing this manually relies on the fact that Bloomberg does not have a function that 
provides these dates automatically and hence, there was no other way to get this information 
besides manually. Regarding the analysis made, I could not find information whether the 
announcements were expected or not to explain the reason why ratings are anticipated. 
Therefore, for future research, it would be interesting to analyse a different period with all the 
large and liquid companies in Europe and take into account ratings that were expected (within 
15 days) and ratings that come out unexpectedly.  In this sense, it could bring a new different 
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Rating Agencies use a rating scale to demonstrate the credit quality of a company. For 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s the rating scale ranges from “Aaa” to “C” and from “AAA” to 
“D” respectively. The best rating for each scale is “Aaa” and “AAA” while the worse rating is ”C” 
and “D”. The credit rating scale is represented below:  
Table A1. Moody’s and S&P’s rating scales 
Moody’s and S&P use different letters to express their opinions about risk, but one’s scale can be 
comparable to other’s scale. These scales are only used for long term ratings as short term ratings are 
expressed differently. Thus, “Aaa” = “AAA”, “Aa1” = “AA+” … and “C”= “D”. For each scale, is associated 
a grade which represents the level of risk so investors can easily understand how risky the issue or 
issuer is before investing.  
Moody's S&P   
Aaa AAA Prime 
Aa1 AA+ 
High grade Aa2 AA 
Aa3 AA- 
A1 A+ 
Upper medium grade A2 A 
A3 A- 
Baa1 BBB+ 
Lower medium grade Baa2 BBB 
Baa3 BBB- 
Ba1 BB+ 
Non-investment grade Ba2 BB 
Ba3 BB- 
B1 B+ 
High speculative B2 B 
B3 B- 
Caa1 CCC+ Substantial risks 
Caa2 CCC Extremely speculative 
Caa3 CCC- 




C D Default 
A bond becomes speculative grade when the credit rating level is at “Ba1” or “BB+” and issuers 
or issues below this grade are considered by the rating agencies to have low credit quality and 
high risk level. According to S&P Global Rating’s methodology, for negative issuer ratings it is 
considered a recovery rating to determine its issue rating. The recovery rating measures the 
percentage of investment recovery in the event of company’s default and takes into 
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consideration available assets, jurisdictions and liability priorities. These ratings are requested 
by the companies to help them to raise funds through interested investors and bank loans. As 
for potential investors and bank loans, ratings are used to analyze whether a company or bond 
is safe or not to invest, or whether the rate of return is high enough to cover the risks. Hence, 
credit ratings are helpful tools for companies to demonstrate, through trustworthy means, 





Table A2. Full sample of the Event Window for upgrades and downgrades 
The following table presents the t-stat results of the cumulative abnormal returns during all the days of the event window 
for downgrades and upgrades of the whole sample. The event study starts on day (-15) and ends on day 30. The table is 
composed by the day of the t-stat result, the standard deviation (STDEV), the average cumulative abnormal results (Average 
CAR), the number of the sample (N) and finally the t-statistics (T-STAT). * means significant at 90%, ** means significant at 
95%, *** means significant at 99%. 
  Downgrade Upgrade 
Days STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT   STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT   
30 0,29147 -3,53% 123 -1,3540   0,08858 2,00% 74 1,9391 * 
29 0,28758 -3,51% 123 -1,3635   0,08737 1,96% 74 1,9335 * 
28 0,27845 -3,46% 123 -1,3913   0,08809 2,02% 74 1,9769 * 
27 0,26845 -3,05% 123 -1,2685   0,08926 1,77% 74 1,7056 * 
26 0,27187 -3,30% 123 -1,3581   0,09405 1,80% 74 1,6468   
25 0,27056 -3,47% 123 -1,4350   0,09080 1,58% 74 1,5007   
24 0,26216 -3,58% 123 -1,5289   0,09050 1,76% 74 1,6693 * 
23 0,25276 -3,44% 123 -1,5208   0,08765 1,81% 74 1,7719 * 
22 0,25124 -3,16% 123 -1,4067   0,08472 1,94% 74 1,9709 * 
21 0,25101 -3,09% 123 -1,3747   0,08013 1,94% 74 2,0775 ** 
20 0,24388 -2,66% 123 -1,2203   0,07715 1,70% 74 1,8977 * 
19 0,24016 -2,65% 123 -1,2335   0,07227 2,07% 74 2,4647 *** 
18 0,24187 -2,95% 123 -1,3624   0,07332 2,22% 74 2,6080 *** 
17 0,24908 -2,73% 123 -1,2259   0,07710 2,20% 74 2,4552 *** 
16 0,24692 -2,69% 123 -1,2177   0,07563 2,14% 74 2,4359 *** 
15 0,24608 -2,59% 123 -1,1769   0,07466 2,10% 74 2,4252 *** 
14 0,25275 -2,62% 123 -1,1606   0,06842 2,10% 74 2,6461 *** 
13 0,24241 -2,43% 123 -1,1222   0,06780 2,19% 74 2,7787 *** 
12 0,23488 -2,44% 123 -1,1630   0,06837 2,22% 74 2,7988 *** 
11 0,23120 -1,94% 123 -0,9370   0,06377 1,70% 74 2,2968 ** 
10 0,23144 -1,69% 123 -0,8186   0,06499 1,74% 74 2,2970 ** 
9 0,22869 -1,59% 123 -0,7757   0,06449 1,59% 74 2,1231 ** 
8 0,22073 -1,60% 123 -0,8089   0,06433 1,61% 74 2,1545 ** 
7 0,23331 -1,82% 123 -0,8712   0,06319 1,50% 74 2,0383 ** 
6 0,23314 -2,40% 123 -1,1503   0,06264 1,54% 74 2,1201 ** 
5 0,21177 -2,06% 123 -1,0873   0,05885 1,37% 74 2,0073 ** 
4 0,21204 -1,75% 123 -0,9209   0,05787 1,57% 74 2,3267 ** 
3 0,13781 -0,59% 123 -0,4751   0,05569 1,55% 74 2,4014 *** 
2 0,13631 -1,21% 123 -0,9940   0,05653 1,70% 74 2,5852 *** 
1 0,13685 -1,40% 123 -1,1403   0,05776 1,33% 74 1,9781 ** 
0 0,13007 -1,05% 123 -0,8985   0,05739 1,29% 74 1,9262 ** 
-1 0,12204 -1,11% 123 -1,0130   0,05481 1,22% 74 1,9072 ** 
-2 0,11757 -1,13% 123 -1,0733   0,04981 1,08% 74 1,8582 ** 
-3 0,12738 -1,41% 123 -1,2345   0,05198 1,06% 74 1,7527 * 
-4 0,11099 -1,13% 123 -1,1350   0,05140 0,61% 74 1,0280   
-5 0,09916 -1,34% 123 -1,5092   0,04851 0,77% 74 1,3653   
-6 0,09631 -1,01% 123 -1,1751   0,04783 0,48% 74 0,8629   
-7 0,08418 -0,79% 123 -1,0538   0,04130 0,55% 74 1,1419   
-8 0,07973 -0,91% 123 -1,2698   0,03916 0,57% 74 1,2593   
-9 0,08175 -0,64% 123 -0,8704   0,04173 0,64% 74 1,3113   
-10 0,07362 -0,57% 123 -0,8604   0,03330 0,22% 74 0,5579   
-11 0,06640 -0,14% 123 -0,2341   0,02749 0,21% 74 0,6470   
-12 0,05268 -0,22% 123 -0,4697   0,02494 0,04% 74 0,1521   
-13 0,04844 -0,41% 123 -0,9369   0,02382 0,15% 74 0,5552   
-14 0,03561 -0,10% 123 -0,3015   0,01957 0,07% 74 0,3292   




Table A3. Full sample of the Event Window for positive and negative watches 
The following table presents the t-stat results of the cumulative abnormal returns during all the days of the event 
window for positive and negative credit watch announcements of the whole sample. The event study starts on day (-15) 
and ends on day 30. The table is composed by the day of the t-stat result, the standard deviation (STDEV), the average 
cumulative abnormal results (Average CAR), the number of the sample (N) and finally the t-statistics (T-STAT). * means 
significant at 90%, ** means significant at 95%, *** means significant at 99%. 
  Positive Negative 
Days STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT   STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT   
30 0,01454 1,10% 25 0,6506   0,12762 1,02% 69 0,6648   
29 0,01462 0,70% 25 0,4149   0,12433 0,33% 69 0,2224   
28 0,01473 0,66% 25 0,3876   0,13074 -0,07% 69 -0,0438   
27 0,01483 0,64% 25 0,3770   0,13602 0,01% 69 0,0061   
26 0,01473 0,53% 25 0,3096   0,13936 0,05% 69 0,0279   
25 0,01466 0,13% 25 0,0722   0,13963 -0,22% 69 -0,1319   
24 0,01477 -0,12% 25 -0,0694   0,13847 -0,70% 69 -0,4206   
23 0,01484 0,10% 25 0,0591   0,12990 -0,54% 69 -0,3437   
22 0,01498 -0,09% 25 -0,0536   0,12950 -0,78% 69 -0,4977   
21 0,01505 -0,41% 25 -0,2449   0,12612 -0,91% 69 -0,6019   
20 0,01501 -0,33% 25 -0,2019   0,11055 -0,73% 69 -0,5459   
19 0,01509 -0,14% 25 -0,0883   0,10001 -1,03% 69 -0,8529   
18 0,01517 0,01% 25 0,0066   0,09572 -0,98% 69 -0,8523   
17 0,01524 0,33% 25 0,2051   0,09525 -0,70% 69 -0,6145   
16 0,01536 0,49% 25 0,3153   0,09177 -0,55% 69 -0,4973   
15 0,01549 0,77% 25 0,5068   0,08847 -0,77% 69 -0,7197   
14 0,01562 0,74% 25 0,4932   0,08531 -1,16% 69 -1,1261   
13 0,01564 1,05% 25 0,6577   0,07901 -0,52% 69 -0,5484   
12 0,01557 0,96% 25 0,5886   0,07611 -0,14% 69 -0,1532   
11 0,01557 1,32% 25 0,8055   0,08159 0,04% 69 0,0413   
10 0,01565 1,78% 25 1,0994   0,09726 -0,75% 69 -0,6388   
9 0,01578 1,66% 25 0,9736   0,09700 -0,61% 69 -0,5254   
8 0,01599 1,58% 25 0,9261   0,09083 -0,79% 69 -0,7210   
7 0,01602 1,72% 25 1,0231   0,08884 -0,38% 69 -0,3541   
6 0,01615 1,65% 25 1,0128   0,08055 -0,93% 69 -0,9607   
5 0,01629 2,20% 25 1,3832   0,07333 -0,79% 69 -0,8901   
4 0,01646 2,51% 25 1,5919   0,06973 -0,36% 69 -0,4328   
3 0,01661 2,57% 25 1,7634 * 0,05737 -0,47% 69 -0,6811   
2 0,01676 2,33% 25 1,8410 * 0,05394 -0,74% 69 -1,1337   
1 0,01703 2,32% 25 1,9208 * 0,04734 -1,23% 69 -2,1640 ** 
0 0,01743 2,19% 25 1,7597 * 0,03701 -0,85% 69 -1,9170 * 
-1 0,01728 2,07% 25 1,6477   0,05481 1,22% 74 1,9072 ** 
-2 0,01647 3,30% 25 2,6283 ** 0,04981 1,08% 74 1,8582 ** 
-3 0,01618 2,68% 25 2,1624 ** 0,05198 1,06% 74 1,7527 * 
-4 0,01632 2,22% 25 1,8216 * 0,05140 0,61% 74 1,0280   
-5 0,01436 1,40% 25 1,4071   0,04851 0,77% 74 1,3653   
-6 0,01449 1,08% 25 1,1634   0,04783 0,48% 74 0,8629   
-7 0,01425 0,86% 25 1,1843   0,04130 0,55% 74 1,1419   
-8 0,01463 0,81% 25 1,1992   0,03916 0,57% 74 1,2593   
-9 0,01466 0,59% 25 0,8767   0,04173 0,64% 74 1,3113   
-10 0,01315 0,38% 25 0,6447   0,03330 0,22% 74 0,5579   
-11 0,01257 0,07% 25 0,1497   0,02749 0,21% 74 0,6470   
-12 0,01270 0,43% 25 0,8791   0,02494 0,04% 74 0,1521   
-13 0,01252 0,36% 25 1,0474   0,02382 0,15% 74 0,5552   
-14 0,00919 -0,27% 25 -0,8983   0,01957 0,07% 74 0,3292   




Table A4. Upgrades and downgrades during crisis period 
The following table presents the t-stat results of the cumulative abnormal returns during all the days of the event 
window for downgrades and upgrades during the financial crisis period. The table is composed by the day of the t-stat 
result, the standard deviation (STDEV), the average cumulative abnormal results (Average CAR), the number of the 
sample (N) and finally the t-statistics (T-STAT). * means significant at 90%, ** means significant at 95%, *** means 
significant at 99%. 
 
Downgrade Upgrade 
Days STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT 
 
STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT 
 30 0,42101 -9,49% 51 -1,6102 
 
0,08786 2,06% 27 1,2193 
 29 0,41306 -9,64% 51 -1,6659 
 
0,08773 2,29% 27 1,3573 
 28 0,39891 -9,33% 51 -1,6706 * 0,08886 2,42% 27 1,4164 
 27 0,38630 -8,30% 51 -1,5342 
 
0,08728 2,01% 27 1,1950 
 26 0,39326 -8,43% 51 -1,5316 
 
0,08980 1,86% 27 1,0772 
 25 0,39177 -8,76% 51 -1,5971 
 
0,08285 1,80% 27 1,1311 
 24 0,37689 -8,94% 51 -1,6946 * 0,08628 1,81% 27 1,0900 
 23 0,36278 -8,51% 51 -1,6755 * 0,08856 2,08% 27 1,2184 
 22 0,36049 -8,32% 51 -1,6476 
 
0,08319 2,44% 27 1,5215 
 21 0,35825 -8,82% 51 -1,7584 * 0,08154 2,55% 27 1,6278 
 20 0,34687 -8,44% 51 -1,7374 * 0,07739 1,98% 27 1,3273 
 19 0,34007 -8,31% 51 -1,7459 * 0,06653 2,83% 27 2,2088 ** 
18 0,34433 -9,13% 51 -1,8938 ** 0,06838 3,07% 27 2,3309 ** 
17 0,35779 -8,94% 51 -1,7851 ** 0,08070 3,12% 27 2,0086 ** 
16 0,35570 -8,82% 51 -1,7716 ** 0,07694 3,38% 27 2,2853 ** 
15 0,35403 -8,68% 51 -1,7514 * 0,07354 3,13% 27 2,2084 ** 
14 0,36222 -9,04% 51 -1,7819 ** 0,06402 2,96% 27 2,3988 ** 
13 0,34551 -8,74% 51 -1,8065 ** 0,06147 3,34% 27 2,8271 *** 
12 0,33695 -8,33% 51 -1,7648 * 0,06011 3,28% 27 2,8336 *** 
11 0,33098 -7,64% 51 -1,6492 
 
0,05407 2,51% 27 2,4153 ** 
10 0,33112 -7,06% 51 -1,5219 
 
0,05702 2,73% 27 2,4839 ** 
9 0,32850 -6,48% 51 -1,4093 
 
0,05396 2,79% 27 2,6874 ** 
8 0,31716 -5,87% 51 -1,3221 
 
0,05692 2,77% 27 2,5314 ** 
7 0,33985 -5,65% 51 -1,1877 
 
0,05887 2,53% 27 2,2359 ** 
6 0,33853 -6,47% 51 -1,3659 
 
0,05764 2,52% 27 2,2683 ** 
5 0,30511 -5,89% 51 -1,3778 
 
0,05377 2,63% 27 2,5456 ** 
4 0,30578 -5,41% 51 -1,2629 
 
0,05238 2,96% 27 2,9312 *** 
3 0,17990 -2,87% 51 -1,1404 
 
0,04936 2,90% 27 3,0514 ** 
2 0,17585 -3,78% 51 -1,5336 
 
0,05105 3,12% 27 3,1735 ** 
1 0,17715 -4,64% 51 -1,8700 ** 0,05962 2,93% 27 2,5568 ** 
0 0,16828 -4,26% 51 -1,8088 ** 0,05833 2,84% 27 2,5341 ** 
-1 0,16260 -3,80% 51 -1,6710 * 0,05502 2,95% 27 2,7845 ** 
-2 0,15641 -3,05% 51 -1,3940 
 
0,05078 2,18% 27 2,2292 ** 
-3 0,18053 -3,14% 51 -1,2431 
 
0,05964 2,23% 27 1,9439 * 
-4 0,14981 -2,44% 51 -1,1632 
 
0,05758 1,60% 27 1,4455 
 -5 0,12209 -1,78% 51 -1,0383 
 
0,05440 1,91% 27 1,8211 * 
-6 0,11281 -0,95% 51 -0,6034 
 
0,05760 1,59% 27 1,4320 
 -7 0,09453 -0,52% 51 -0,3930 
 
0,04978 1,70% 27 1,7715 * 
-8 0,09744 -1,07% 51 -0,7871 
 
0,05140 1,61% 27 1,6251 
 -9 0,09449 -0,83% 51 -0,6310 
 
0,05342 1,99% 27 1,9320 * 
-10 0,07359 -0,68% 51 -0,6643 
 
0,04327 1,11% 27 1,3370 
 -11 0,06585 0,08% 51 0,0815 
 
0,03040 0,89% 27 1,5170 
 -12 0,04987 0,02% 51 0,0320 
 
0,02881 0,56% 27 1,0186 
 -13 0,04696 -0,23% 51 -0,3546 
 
0,02847 0,62% 27 1,1259 
 -14 0,04019 -0,31% 51 -0,5520 
 
0,02247 0,69% 27 1,5959 
 -15 0,03291 0,12% 51 0,2693 
 
0,01533 -0,05% 27 -0,1857 




Table A5. Upgrades and Downgrades of financial companies 
The following table presents the t-stat results of the cumulative abnormal returns during all the days of the event 
window for downgrades and upgrades of financial companies. It is composed into two CAR’s groups. One is from day -
15 to the announcement day and the other one is from the announcement day to the day +30. The table is composed 
by the day of the t-stat result, the standard deviation (STDEV), the average cumulative abnormal results (Average CAR), 
the number of the sample (N) and finally the t-statistics (T-STAT). * means significant at 90%, ** means significant at 
95%, *** means significant at 99%. 
 Downgrade Upgrade 
Days STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT 
 
STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT 
 30 0,32522 -7,79% 36 -1,43659 
 
0,06129 -1,35% 17 -0,90639 
 29 0,31472 -7,96% 36 -1,51825 
 
0,05885 -1,10% 17 -0,76906 
 28 0,29694 -7,66% 36 -1,54845 
 
0,05874 -0,77% 17 -0,53895 
 27 0,28333 -6,61% 36 -1,39944 
 
0,05156 -1,34% 17 -1,07247 
 26 0,29242 -7,34% 36 -1,50553 
 
0,05051 -1,72% 17 -1,40338 
 25 0,29177 -7,24% 36 -1,48958 
 
0,04263 -1,85% 17 -1,78861 * 
24 0,27598 -7,44% 36 -1,61649 
 
0,04360 -1,90% 17 -1,80067 * 
23 0,25877 -7,23% 36 -1,67574 
 
0,04622 -1,08% 17 -0,96171 
 22 0,25300 -6,54% 36 -1,5511 
 
0,04377 -0,98% 17 -0,9252 
 21 0,25036 -6,11% 36 -1,46537 
 
0,04032 -0,59% 17 -0,6049 
 20 0,23966 -4,53% 36 -1,13416 
 
0,04297 -0,99% 17 -0,94965 
 19 0,23608 -4,60% 36 -1,16926 
 
0,04877 -0,54% 17 -0,45748 
 18 0,23956 -5,84% 36 -1,4634 
 
0,05216 0,00% 17 0,000344 
 17 0,26074 -6,09% 36 -1,40167 
 
0,05633 0,66% 17 0,482844 
 16 0,26363 -5,59% 36 -1,27213 
 
0,05020 0,46% 17 0,379115 
 15 0,26066 -5,41% 36 -1,24622 
 
0,04071 -0,05% 17 -0,05353 
 14 0,27857 -6,14% 36 -1,32184 
 
0,03774 -0,55% 17 -0,603 
 13 0,26606 -5,49% 36 -1,238 
 
0,03529 -0,45% 17 -0,52668 
 12 0,25497 -5,28% 36 -1,24345 
 
0,03194 -0,79% 17 -1,02192 
 11 0,24625 -4,00% 36 -0,97411 
 
0,02882 -0,82% 17 -1,17592 
 10 0,24343 -3,67% 36 -0,90393 
 
0,02728 -0,82% 17 -1,24389 
 9 0,23901 -3,59% 36 -0,90118 
 
0,03257 -0,86% 17 -1,08942 
 8 0,22381 -4,06% 36 -1,08857 
 
0,02805 -0,78% 17 -1,14748 
 7 0,25367 -4,11% 36 -0,97099 
 
0,02879 -0,60% 17 -0,86141 
 6 0,25649 -5,47% 36 -1,27968 
 
0,02767 -0,43% 17 -0,6431 
 5 0,21054 -4,60% 36 -1,31101 
 
0,02645 -0,31% 17 -0,48077 
 4 0,21236 -4,03% 36 -1,13969 
 
0,02347 0,14% 17 0,252086 
 3 0,09692 0,40% 36 0,25045 
 
0,02230 0,40% 17 0,743585 
 2 0,09314 -0,74% 36 -0,47668 
 
0,01800 0,91% 17 2,075162 ** 
1 0,07030 -0,99% 36 -0,84116 
 
0,01921 0,50% 17 1,076606 
 0 0,04506 -0,56% 36 -0,745 
 
0,01316 0,48% 17 1,496816 
            0 0,19996 -2,65% 36 -0,79631 
 
0,05226 0,15% 17 0,119414 
 -1 0,19445 -2,09% 36 -0,64624 
 
0,04930 -0,33% 17 -0,27295 
 -2 0,19385 -2,15% 36 -0,667 
 
0,04328 0,18% 17 0,174961 
 -3 0,21624 -3,15% 36 -0,87384 
 
0,05394 0,40% 17 0,303542 
 -4 0,18334 -2,27% 36 -0,74163 
 
0,05038 0,36% 17 0,293785 
 -5 0,16018 -2,03% 36 -0,75909 
 
0,04287 0,11% 17 0,106224 
 -6 0,15321 -0,52% 36 -0,20408 
 
0,04698 0,31% 17 0,276335 
 -7 0,12851 -0,68% 36 -0,31517 
 
0,04313 0,26% 17 0,244431 
 -8 0,12233 -1,24% 36 -0,60615 
 
0,04754 0,88% 17 0,763919 
 -9 0,12370 -1,35% 36 -0,65692 
 
0,05954 1,67% 17 1,157636 
 -10 0,10875 -0,81% 36 -0,44884 
 
0,04794 1,00% 17 0,86004 
 -11 0,09412 0,18% 36 0,116303 
 
0,03393 0,35% 17 0,426516 
 -12 0,07450 0,47% 36 0,382107 
 
0,03077 0,10% 17 0,137325 
 -13 0,06864 0,29% 36 0,250079 
 
0,03234 0,55% 17 0,702087 
 -14 0,04869 0,67% 36 0,830418 
 
0,02615 0,31% 17 0,481578 
 -15 0,03631 0,48% 36 0,800179 
 




Table A6. Upgrades and Downgrades of non-financial companies 
The following table presents the t-stat results of the cumulative abnormal returns during all the days of the event 
window for downgrades and upgrades of non-financial companies. It is composed into two CAR’s groups. One is from 
day -15 to the announcement day and the other one is from the announcement day to the day +30. The table is 
composed by the day of the t-stat result, the standard deviation (STDEV), the average cumulative abnormal results 
(Average CAR), the number of the sample (N) and finally the t-statistics (T-STAT). * means significant at 90%, ** means 
significant at 95%, *** means significant at 99%. 
 
Downgrade Upgrade 
Days STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT 
 
STDEV Average CAR N T-STAT 
 30 0,1207 -0,21% 87 -0,1586 
 
0,0683 1,42% 57 1,5650 
 29 0,1157 -0,10% 87 -0,0806 
 
0,0682 1,30% 57 1,4385 
 28 0,1076 -0,16% 87 -0,1427 
 
0,0702 1,28% 57 1,3754 
 27 0,1041 -0,01% 87 -0,0076 
 
0,0718 1,12% 57 1,1779 
 26 0,1019 -0,07% 87 -0,0639 
 
0,0749 1,27% 57 1,2822 
 25 0,1039 -0,35% 87 -0,3132 
 
0,0744 1,03% 57 1,0451 
 24 0,0999 -0,43% 87 -0,4002 
 
0,0732 1,27% 57 1,3106 
 23 0,0975 -0,31% 87 -0,2940 
 
0,0710 1,09% 57 1,1572 
 22 0,0975 -0,20% 87 -0,1910 
 
0,0667 1,24% 57 1,3972 
 21 0,1000 -0,27% 87 -0,2519 
 
0,0633 1,11% 57 1,3246 
 20 0,0999 -0,33% 87 -0,3041 
 
0,0615 0,93% 57 1,1388 
 19 0,0978 -0,28% 87 -0,2661 
 
0,0480 1,27% 57 1,9992 * 
18 0,0948 -0,19% 87 -0,1828 
 
0,0482 1,31% 57 2,0504 ** 
17 0,0911 0,22% 87 0,2278 
 
0,0494 1,08% 57 1,6535 
 16 0,0877 0,07% 87 0,0786 
 
0,0488 1,07% 57 1,6479 
 15 0,0842 0,14% 87 0,1564 
 
0,0479 1,17% 57 1,8448 * 
14 0,0827 0,39% 87 0,4435 
 
0,0432 1,32% 57 2,3071 ** 
13 0,0798 0,39% 87 0,4613 
 
0,0405 1,40% 57 2,6102 ** 
12 0,0742 0,30% 87 0,3716 
 
0,0413 1,55% 57 2,8289 *** 
11 0,0729 0,48% 87 0,6116 
 
0,0398 0,88% 57 1,6673 * 
10 0,0709 0,69% 87 0,9012 
 
0,0415 0,92% 57 1,6766 * 
9 0,0652 0,81% 87 1,1524 
 
0,0391 0,75% 57 1,4390 
 8 0,0622 0,99% 87 1,4787 
 
0,0376 0,75% 57 1,4996 
 7 0,0622 0,69% 87 1,0372 
 
0,0382 0,55% 57 1,0784 
 6 0,0595 0,44% 87 0,6834 
 
0,0398 0,56% 57 1,0536 
 5 0,0555 0,56% 87 0,9324 
 
0,0334 0,30% 57 0,6721 
 4 0,0534 0,76% 87 1,3331 
 
0,0308 0,41% 57 1,0097 
 3 0,0508 0,57% 87 1,0432 
 
0,0241 0,32% 57 1,0051 
 2 0,0452 0,16% 87 0,3221 
 
0,0235 0,36% 57 1,1484 
 1 0,0425 0,00% 87 -0,0051 
 
0,0211 0,00% 57 -0,0104 
 0 0,0276 0,32% 87 1,0723 
 
0,0156 -0,05% 57 -0,2505 
 
           0 0,0870 -0,38% 87 -0,4068 
 
0,0588 1,62% 57 2,0826 ** 
-1 0,0754 -0,70% 87 -0,8620 
 
0,0559 1,67% 57 2,2610 ** 
-2 0,0652 -0,70% 87 -1,0069 
 
0,0517 1,34% 57 1,9618 * 
-3 0,0617 -0,69% 87 -1,0359 
 
0,0517 1,26% 57 1,8347 * 
-4 0,0610 -0,66% 87 -1,0021 
 
0,0521 0,69% 57 1,0001 
 -5 0,0590 -1,05% 87 -1,6668 
 
0,0502 0,97% 57 1,4522 
 -6 0,0599 -1,22% 87 -1,8917 * 0,0485 0,53% 57 0,8238 
 -7 0,0577 -0,84% 87 -1,3617 
 
0,0411 0,64% 57 1,1675 
 -8 0,0541 -0,77% 87 -1,3269 
 
0,0367 0,48% 57 0,9897 
 -9 0,0568 -0,34% 87 -0,5575 
 
0,0349 0,33% 57 0,7088 
 -10 0,0536 -0,46% 87 -0,8083 
 
0,0276 -0,02% 57 -0,0489 
 -11 0,0514 -0,27% 87 -0,4935 
 
0,0256 0,16% 57 0,4829 
 -12 0,0406 -0,51% 87 -1,1696 
 
0,0232 0,03% 57 0,0866 
 -13 0,0372 -0,69% 87 -1,7362 
 
0,0208 0,04% 57 0,1280 
 -14 0,0283 -0,41% 87 -1,3677 
 
0,0174 0,01% 57 0,0266 
 -15 0,0198 -0,12% 87 -0,5437 
 
0,0121 0,20% 57 1,2229 
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